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Abstract

Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to
a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., network, servers, storage,
applications and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. During the last a few years,
data security and integrity in cloud computing has emerged as a significantly important research area that has attracted increasing attention from both industry and
academia. The virtual environment of cloud computing allows users to access computing power that exceeds what is contained within their own physical worlds. To
enter this virtual environment, cloud users must transfer data throughout the cloud.
Typically, cloud users know neither the exact location of their data nor the other
sources of the data collectively stored with theirs. Consequently, several data security and integrity concerns have arisen, including key management, access control,
searchable encryption techniques, remote integrity checks and proof of ownership in
the cloud.
The first aspect of the work presented in this thesis is tree-based key management
in cloud computing. Data encryption before outsourcing to the cloud is a common
way to protect data privacy. Thus, key management is a challenging issue in cloud
computing. It is the ability to correctly assign, monitor and secure keys which
defines the level of operational security provided by any encryption implementation.
The fundamental idea of this work is to design a secure and flexible key management
mechanism for the outsourced data in cloud computing. In this thesis, an innovative
tree-based key management scheme is proposed. The outsourced database remains
private and secure, while some selected data and key nodes are shared with other
parties in the cloud. Flexibility of key management is achieved and the security is
proved in the standard model.
The second aspect of the work presented in this thesis is fine-grained access
control. In order to secure the outsourced data in the cloud, designing efficient
v

and secure access control is a challenging issue. Unlike traditional access control
in which the data users and storage servers are in the same trust domain, access
control techniques are very different in cloud computing, as the cloud servers are
not trusted by most cloud users. The key idea of this work is to attribute sets-based
access control. This thesis points out that any access policy can be defined as a
logical expression formula over different attribute sets. Logical expression indicates
what kind of user is allowed to access the data. A fine-grained and efficient access
control is proposed, based on logical expression.
The third aspect of the work presented in this thesis is efficient searchable encryption techniques in cloud computing. Because the data is usually encrypted before
being outsourced to the cloud, searching the encrypted data in cloud computing
has recently gained attention and led to the development of efficient searchable encryption techniques. The fundamental idea of this work is to reduce the search cost
on encrypted data. In this thesis, a practical keyword searching mechanism is proposed. The solution is very simple. It enables efficient multi-user keyword searches
and hides the private information in the search queries. The security is proved in
the standard model.
The fourth aspect of the work presented in this thesis is public remote data
integrity checks. As the clients store important data in remote cloud storage without
a local copy, it is important to check the remote data integrity. Design of efficient
remote integrity check protocols without downloading the data is a challenging issue
in cloud computing. The key idea of this work is a public remote integrity check
based on zero-knowledge proof. In this thesis, an innovative public remote integrity
check scheme (PRIC) is proposed. No information of either the verified data or the
homomorphic tags is leaked. In addition, the experiment result shows that PRIC
is efficient, especially when the data size is large or the integrity check is frequent.
The security of PRIC is proved in the random oracle model.
The last aspect of the work presented in this thesis is proof of multiparty ownership for encrypted data in the cloud. There are many applications of ownership
sharing by different users and the design of the proof protocols of joint ownership
is a challenging issue. Meanwhile, the design of proof-of-ownership mechanisms for
encrypted data is even more difficult. This is because encryption of the same file by
different users with random keys results in different ciphertexts, and the cloud server
cannot store the same hash root value for ownership verification. In this thesis, a
proof of multiparty ownership solution (PMOW) with encrypted data is proposed.
vi

Every user can prove that he/she holds the plaintext of the encrypted file when the
server stores one ciphertext only. In addition, a PMOW system is constructed. The
security of PMOW is proved in the ideal cipher model.
The major contribution of this thesis is innovative and improved approaches to
secure data in cloud computing. Using these approaches developed, a trustworthy
cloud environment can be achieved.

vii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There are a number of attempts to define cloud computing in various ways. Among
definitions, the widely accepted one is proposed by [MG09] as follows: ‘cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared
pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., network, servers, storage, applications and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction’. There are five essential characteristics
of the cloud model [MG09]:
• Rapid elasticity. The computing capabilities can be elastically provisioned and
released. To the cloud users, the capabilities available for provisioning appear
to be unlimited and can be assigned in any quantity at any time.
• Service on demand. The cloud users can use on-demand services such as
server time and network storage, without requiring human interaction with
each service provider.
• Broad network access. The cloud services are always available over the network
and can be accessed by different user platforms.
• Location independence. The cloud provider’s computing resources are pooled
to serve multiple users using a multi-tenant model. It is location independence
that the cloud users have no control or knowledge over the exact location of
the provided resources.
• Measuring service. Cloud resource usage can be monitored, controlled and
reported by the cloud providers.
The above advantages of cloud computing have dramatically changed the IT
scene, as cloud computing offers cost savings and improvements to major operations. For example, cloud computing offers individuals and companies affordable
1
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storage, professional maintenance and adjustable space. Many large technology
companies (e.g., Amazon, Google, Microsoft) have built huge server centres to offer
cloud computing with virtual applications, various services and business software
with self-service interface so that cloud users can use on-demand resources with
location independence [Erd09].
Such indirect control of the physical infrastructure, however, introduces vulnerabilities unknown in previous settings. Since resources are provided over the internet,
the cloud is a single point of access for all the users. The cloud model for delivering
computing power and processing, has raised several security questions. Ensuring security is more difficult when designing cloud architectures than in non-cloud contexts
[GMCL09, RVR+ 07, BYV+ 09]. The security issues in cloud computing include: 1)
data security, 2) identity and access control, 3) key management and 4) virtual machine security. Among these main security issues in the cloud, data security and
integrity is believed to be the most difficult problem which could limit the use of
cloud computing [RTSS09]. In fact, access control and key management are all issues
involved in data security.
Data security in the cloud refers to data confidentiality, integrity, availability and traceability (CIAT), and these requirements pose major problems for cloud
computing. Data confidentiality requires that information be available or disclosed
only to authorized individuals, entities or IT processes. Data integrity ensures that
the data is maintained in its original state and has not been intentionally or accidentally altered or deleted. Data availability ensures continuous access to data
even in the event of a natural or man-made disaster or events such as fires or power
outages. Data traceability means that the data and communications are genuine in
a transaction and that both parties involved are who they claim to be. Specifically,
to achieve the above requirements of CIAT, the critical security challenges of data
security in the cloud can be mainly outlined as follows: 1) key management, 2)
access control, 3) searchable encryption techniques, 4) remote integrity
check and 5) proof of ownership.

1.1

Motivations and Contributions

This thesis addresses the above critical data security challenges in the cloud. Security
mechanisms are designed to ensure a trustworthy cloud environment.
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3

Key Management. Data encryption before outsourcing to the cloud is a common
and simple way to protect data privacy. Although the encryption algorithms are
public, information encrypted under these algorithms is secure because the key used
to encrypt the data remains secret. As a result, key management is a critical element
in cloud computing. It is the ability to correctly assign, secure and monitor keys that
defines the level of operational security provided by any encryption implementation.
The classical tree-based hierarchy schemes such as RFC2627 [WHA99]) and the
scheme proposed by Wong et al. [WGL98] have been widely used in group key
management. In RFC2627 [WHA99], the hierarchical tree approach is the recommended approach to address the multicast key management problem. Many
key management methods of access hierarchies for data outsourcing have been proposed [WLOB09, DdVJ+ 03, BCdV+ 09, dVFJ+ 07a, ABFF09, PL01] based on this
approach. These methods provide some useful solutions to minimize the number
of cryptographic keys which have to be managed and stored. Aiming to provide
secure and efficient access to outsourced data, Wang et al. [WLOB09] proposed
a tree-based cryptographic key management scheme for cloud storage. Their treebased key management structure is similar to a traditional one, where a single root
node holds the master key that can be used to derive other node keys. Each node
key can be used to derive the keys of its children in the tree hierarchy. With their
scheme, a data block stored in the cloud can be deleted or updated by a party who
holds either the specific decryption key or a node key corresponding to one of its
parents. If there is an outsourcing server authorized to manage a node (not the root
node) that has several child nodes, then the outsourced party is granted the node
key, which can be used to derive all sub-keys for its child nodes. In other words,
once a parent node in the tree is given, all the child nodes will be known. This is
a common problem which exists in many tree-based key management schemes. Existing ones such as [WLOB09, DdVF+ 05, DdVF+ 07, dVFJ+ 08, dVFJ+ 07b, AFB05,
YLZL01, KPT00, NNL01a, LNS03, KLKJ06, SL04, BSS11] can work perfectly, only
if when all legitimate node users are authorized to access all the child nodes under
the specific parent node.
Considering the above problem, an innovative tree-based key management scheme
is proposed. With the proposed key management scheme, the outsourced database
can remain private and secure, while some selected data and key nodes are shared
with other parties. The proposed scheme is also a flexible key management solution
that can be adapted and expanded for different scenarios (e.g., multiple branches
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and multiple sub-keys). The security of the proposed scheme is proved in the standard model. The proposed tree-based outsourcing key management opens up an
entirely new approach for secure and flexible key management.
Access Control. Unlike the traditional access control in which the data users and
storage servers are in the same trusted domain, access control techniques are very
different in cloud computing because the cloud servers are not seen as trustworthy
by most cloud users, especially large enterprises and organizations. One possible
method to enforce data access control without relying on cloud servers could be to
encrypt data individually and disclose the corresponding decryption keys only to
the privileged users, but that causes high performance costs. A fine-grained access
control which is efficient and secure is important and necessary for cloud computing.
Several advancements have already been proposed [LZC+ 10, LWG11, CSK11,
BLLS11, ZLS11, Lee12, ZHA+ 12, WeLD12, ASB+ 12, YLJ12, SWYW12, GM09,
HYJZ09]. An existing feasible solution to achieve fine-grained access control of
outsourced data in cloud computing is to encrypt the data through certain cryptographic primitives and only disclose the private keys to authorized users. Without
the appropriate decryption keys, unauthorized users including the cloud providers,
cannot decrypt the data. This solution has been widely used (such as [dVFJ+ 07b,
KRS+ 03]) and most schemes using it are deployed by introducing a per file groups
for efficiency. However, the complexity of these schemes [BKP09, HCM01, CHR09,
TWZ09, YC10, LYRL10, TS11] is proportional to the system scale and the number
of users. Additionally, this solution lacks scalability and flexibility, especially if the
number of authorized users becomes large.
Vimercati et al. [dVFJ+ 07b] proposed an access control scheme for securing data
stoppage on untrusted servers based on key derivation methods [AFB05]. In their
scheme, the owner created corresponding public tokens to grant access for a user.
With his secret key, the user was able to derive decryption keys for desired files.
However, the complexity of operations of file creation and user grant/revocation is
also linear to the number of users. Ateniese et al. [AFGH05] proposed a secure
distributed storage scheme based on proxy re-encryption. Specifically, the data
owner encrypted blocks of content with a master public key, which could only be
decrypted by the master private key. The data owner then generated proxy reencryption keys by using his master private key and the user’s public key. With the
proxy re-encryption keys, the semi-trusted proxies could convert the ciphertext into

1.1. Motivations and Contributions

5

another ciphertext for a specific user. Thus, they achieved access control. However,
the main problem with this scheme is that user access privilege is not protected from
the proxy.
Recently, ABE has been seen as an ideal technique for achieving flexible, scalable
and fine-grained access control mechanisms in the cloud. Wang et al. [WLW10] proposed a hierarchical attribute-based encryption scheme to achieve fine-grained access
control in cloud storage services by combining hierarchical identity-based encryption and ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE). In their scheme,
they assumed that all attributes in one conjunctive clause were administered by
the same domain master. However it is difficult to implement in practice so that
the same attribute can be administrated by multiple domain masters according to
specific policies. Another difficulty is that their scheme cannot support compound
attributes efficiently and does not support multiple value assignments. Yu et al.
[YWRL10] stretched out a scalable data access control scheme for cloud computing which combines techniques of key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE),
proxy re-encryption and lazy re-encryption. In their scheme, the cloud servers were
unable to learn the plaintexts though data re-encryption, however the encryptor in
their scheme is not able to decide who can decrypt the encrypted data and has no
choice but to trust the key issuer. In addition, the cloud servers must learn the
whole user ID list and attribute list in exchange.
To tackle these problems, an encryption system is proposed to achieve practical, flexible and fine-grained access control on outsourced data. In particular, the
problem of defining and assigning keys to users based on different attribute sets is
concerned. The access policies are hidden as well as user information to the thirdparty cloud servers. Through the protocol executions, there is no leakage of users’
privacy. The proposed scheme is partially based on the observation that, in practical
application scenarios, each user can be associated with a set of attributes, which are
meaningful in the access policy and data file context. The access policy can thus
be defined as a logical expression formula over different attribute sets. The logical
expression can indicate what kind of user is allowed to access the data file. As any
access policy can be represented as such a logical expression formula, fine-grained
access control can be achieved.
Searchable Encryption Techniques. As the data is usually encrypted before
being outsourced to cloud servers, how to search the encrypted data in the cloud
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has recently gained attention and led to the development of searchable encryption
techniques. This problem is challenging however, because meeting performance,
system usability and scalability requirements is extremely difficult.
In theory, the classical work of Goldreich et al. [GO96] on oblivious randomaccess machines (RAMs) could resolve the problem of doing (private) searches on
remote encrypted data. They enabled a client to store only a constant amount of
data in local storage. Meanwhile, the identities of the remote data files were hidden
when the client accessed them. Oblivious RAM is often cited as a powerful tool,
which can be used, for example, for search on encrypted data or for preventing cache
attack. However, oblivious RAM is also commonly considered to be impractical due
to its overhead. Suppose the client stores n data files in remote storage, then each
data request is replaced by O(log4 n) or O(log3 n) requests. Additionally, O(n·log n)
external memory is required in order to store the n data files.
In an effort to reduce the round complexity associated with oblivious RAMs,
Song et al. [SWP00] presented a solution for searchable encryption. After that, the
question of how to do keyword searches on encrypted data efficiently was raised. In
[SWP00], they achieved searchable encryption by constructing a special two-layered
encryption for each word. Given a trapdoor, the server could strip the outer layer
and assertain whether the inner layer was in the correct form. The limitations
in this construction are as follows. First, it is not compatible with existing file
encryption schemes and a specific encryption method must be used. Second, while
the construction is proven to be a secure encryption scheme, it is not proven to be
a secure searchable encryption scheme. Third, the distribution of the underlying
plaintext is vulnerable to statistical attacks. Their approach may leak the locations
of the keyword in a file. Finally, their searching time is linear in the length of the
document collection.
The above limitations are addressed by Goh [jG03], Chang and Mitzenmacher
[CM05] and also Curtmola et al. [CGKO06], etc. In [jG03], they built an index
of keywords for each file using a Bloom filter with pseudo-random functions used
as hash functions. One inherent problem with this Bloom filter-based approach is
that Bloom filters can induce false positives, which would potentially cause mobile
users to download extra files not containing the keyword. In [CM05], Chang and
Mitzenmacher achieved the notion of security to IND2-CKA for chosen keyword
attack, however their scheme cannot guarantee that the trapdoors do not leak any
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information about the words being queried. In [CGKO06], they proposed a multiuser construction that is efficient on the server side, however every node in the link
list has to be augmented with information about the file index of the next node.
In a different direction, Boneh, di Crescenzo, Ostvrosky and Persiano [BCOP04]
and Boneh, Kuchilevitz, Ostvrosky and Skeith [BKOI07] studied the problem of
how to search on data encrypted by a public-key cryptosystem. These schemes are
motivated by an encrypted email system. Their constructions, however, have an
overhead in search time that is proportional to the square root of the database size,
which is far less efficient then the best private-key solutions. Boneh et al.’s approach
[BCOP04] is known to be the seminal public key encryption scheme with keyword
search (PEKS). It was observed in [BSNS05] that Boneh et al.’s scheme [BCOP04]
requires a secure channel, which makes it impractical.
To reduce the search cost on encrypted data and design a practical searching
mechanism in cloud computing, an efficient keyword search scheme for cloud computing is proposed. The proposed solution is very simple. It enables efficient multiuser keyword searches over outsourced data files in the cloud environment, without
leaking any private information about either the data owner or users in the search
query.
Remote Integrity Check. Storing data in remote cloud servers has become common practice. As clients store their important data in remote cloud servers without
a local copy, it is important to check the remote data integrity (RIC). While it is easy
to check data integrity after completely downloading the data, it is a large waste of
communication bandwidth. Hence, designing efficient remote integrity check protocols without downloading the data is an important security issue in the cloud.
Early verification schemes [BEG+ 94, BGG95, NR05] concentrated on the problem of data integrity on a local untrusted memory, i.e., memory checking. The challenging problem of data integrity verification without explicit knowledge of the full
file was first proposed in broad generality by Blum et al. [BEG+ 94], who explored
the task of checking the correctness of a memory-management program efficiently.
Naor and Rothblum [NR05] explored the problem of dynamic memory-checking in
a range of settings. Clarke et al. [CSG+ 05] focused on a trusted party which stores
a small amount of state information, verifying the integrity of arbitrary blocks of
external memory. These early verification schemes are the first to suggest checking data integrity, however they are not applicable for remote data integrity check
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because they require the data to be transmitted in its entirety to the verifier.
The latest verification schemes concentrated on the problems of securing data
integrity at remote servers and securing cloud storage applications. These schemes
can be classified into ‘Proof of retrievability’ (POR) schemes (e.g., [JJ07, BJO09,
DVW09, SW08]) and ‘Provable data possession’ (PDP) schemes (e.g., [ABC+ 07,
ABC+ 11, EKPT09]). A POR scheme is a challenge-response protocol. In POR
schemes, a cloud provider demonstrates the file retrievability (i.e., recoverability
without any loss or corruption) to a client. PDP schemes are similar protocols
which only detect a large amount of corruption in outsourced data. Several advances
have already been proposed [SBMS07, OR05, DQS04, FB06, SBD+ 04, SM06, JJ07,
DVW09, ABC+ 07, ABC+ 11, WWL+ 09, WCW+ 09]. In Shah et al. [SBMS07], they
introduced a third-party verifier who could delegate the periodic task of checking
data integrity. In their scheme, they reduced the client’s storage, communicational
and computational cost. This simple solution, however, requires a third-party verifier to keep a lot of hash values of the data blocks. In Oprea et al. [OR05], they
allowed a client to detect the modification of data blocks by a remote and untrusted
server. Their protocol did not bring additional storage cost to the server and the
client, but the entire file had to be retrieved during the verification executions. In
addition, the communication complexity is linear in the file size. Deswarte et al.
[DQS04] and Filho et al. [FB06] proposed techniques to verify data integrity using
RSA-based hash functions. Their schemes allowed a verifier to perform multiple
challenges using the same metadata. The limitation of their algorithms lies in the
computational complexity at the server. The computation costs must exponentiate
the entire data file. In addition, RSA over the entire file is extremely slow. As is
showed in Filho et at. [FB06], it required 20 seconds per megabyte for 1024-bit
keys on a GHz3.0 CPU. Yamamoto et al. [YOA07] presented an efficient scheme
for large data integrity check. Their scheme was based on homomorphic hash functions. The advantage of their scheme is batch processing [CY07] for a homomorphic
hash function. Similar techniques can also be found in Sebe et al. [SBD+ 04]. In
[SBD+ 04], they presented a protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman problem in ZN ,
however the client has to store N bits per data block (N is the RSA modulus). The
total storage cost on the client side is O(n). Juels et al. [JJ07] proposed a scheme for
proof of retrievability by using ‘sentinels’. The sentinels (special blocks) were hidden
among other blocks in file F . The verifier challenged the prover by specifying the
positions of a collection of sentinels and asking the prover to return the associated
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sentinel values. Their scheme is limited as they can handle only a limited number of
queries and increase storage overhead on the server side. In Dodis et al. [DVW09],
they improved the POR constructions. They built nearly optimal POR codes using
hitting samplers and error-correcting codes. Ateniese et al. [ABC+ 07, ABC+ 11]
described a proof of data possession (PDP) scheme that improved the response
length of the simple hash scheme by using homomorphic verifiable tags. In their
scheme, they constructed the homomorphic verifiable tags {Ti } (1 6 i 6 n) for n
P
data block {mi }. Later, the prover sent a linear combination of blocks i ai mi
(with arbitrary coefficients {ai }) to the verifier. The verifier cloud be convinced
P
if i ai mi was correctly generated using an aggregate tag T computed from {Ti }.
They also proposed a variant of their PDP scheme to achieve public verifiability under a weaker security model. Erway et al. [EKPT09] introduced a framework and
efficient constructions for dynamic provable data possession which extends Ateniese
et al.’s model [ABC+ 07] to support provable updates. Their constructions captured
the dynamic operations such as insertion in the middle of a file, however they are
not efficient when moving and deleting the entire files. Shacham and Waters [SW08]
proposed an HTAG scheme which used a simple homomorphic MAC and a universal
hash family to reduce the communication bits to a constant factor of k. They also
achieved public verifiability in which the third party verifier could extract the data
file through multiple challenges and responses. Most previous public RIC schemes,
however, which include [SW08, ABC+ 07, ABC+ 11] do not provide security and this
means a public verifier can learn the information of private data during an integrity
check, since the cloud server might leak the data information.
It is noticed that Hao, Zhong and Yue’s public RIC scheme [HZY11] provided
a security feature against data leakage. They adopted the approach introduced
by Sebe et al. [SFB+ 08] to support data dynamics and privacy, but their scheme
requires the verifier to be in possession of all the homomorphic tags used for the
integrity check. Therefore, it increases costs for storage and communication. In
addition, although they prove that the public verifier cannot learn the target data,
the tags themselves can leak some information about the data.
To overcome these problems, a privacy-preserving RIC protocol which achieves
public verifiability without disclosing any information is proposed. No information
about the original data will be leaked. In fact, the verifier is only required to
know the public key of the data owner. The experimental results indicate that the
proposed scheme is efficient, especially when the data size is large or the integrity
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check is frequent. The full proofs of security under the random oracle model are
also given.
Proof of Ownership. Beyond storage correctness, proof of ownership (POW) is
another security issue related to cloud data storage. Client-side deduplication allows
an attacker to gain access to arbitrary-size files when he has small hash signatures of
the files. To overcome such attacks, the technique of POW allows a user to efficiently
prove to a cloud server about his ownership, rather than short information about
the file such as a hash value.
Proof-of-ownership (POW) is closely related to two other similar problems: proof
of retrievability (POR) and proof of data possession (PDP). POR schemes [JJ07],
[SW08], [BJO09], [DVW09], [ZX11] are challenge-response protocols. In POR schemes,
a cloud provider demonstrates the file retrievability (i.e., recoverability without any
loss or corruption) to the client. PDP schemes [ABC+ 07], [ABC+ 11], [EKPT09],
[SFB+ 08], [FB06], [SBD+ 04], [WWL+ 09, WWRL10, WWR+ 11, ZB12, YOA07] are
similar protocols which only detect a large amount of corruption in outsourced data.
The main difference between POW and POR/PDP is that the latter usually uses a
pre-processing step on the client side while the former does not.
POW protocols are proposed for client-side data deduplication which enables the
storage server to store a single copy of repeating data. Client-side data deduplication
has become popular and important as it removes data redundancy and data replication, but it brings many data privacy and security issues for the user. Douceur
et al. [DAB+ 02] first studied the problem of deduplication in a multi-tenant system
in which deduplication had to be reconciled with confidentiality. Their proposed
convergent encryption enabled two users to produce a single ciphertext for deduplication. As there are many security problems with convergent encryption, Storer et
al. [SGLM08] proposed a security model for secure data deduplication. Recently,
Harnik et al. [HPSP10] formally identified the security problems of client-side deduplication as follows: 1) The first kind of attacks attempted to fool the storage server
and abuse the storage system. A malicious user with the hash signature of a file
could convince the cloud server that he owns the file. By accepting the hash value
as a ‘proxy’ for the entire file, the cloud server allowed anyone who held the hash
value to access the entire file. 2) The second kind of attacks targeted the privacy
and confidentiality of users of the storage system. A malicious user could check
whether another honest user had already outsourced a data file by trying to upload
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it as well. 3) The third kind of attacks focused on subverting the intended use of a
storage system. For example, two malicious users tried to use the cloud storage for
a covert channel as they might not have a direct interaction channel. The two users
first pre-agreed on two different files. Second, one malicious user outsourced one of
the two files. Then the other user could detect which file had been deduplicated and
output either 0 (for the fist file) or 1 (for the second file). In this way, two malicious users successfully exchange a bit of information without a direct transmitting
channel.
To overcome such attacks, Halevi et al. [HHPSP11] introduced the notion of
POW for client-side deduplication. In addition, they presented Merkle tree-based
schemes to allow a user to efficiently prove his ownership to the server, rather than
some short information. However, their scheme cannot be adopted for encrypted file
scenario, because encryption of the same file by different users with random keys
results in different ciphertexts. The server cannot store the same hash root value
for the ownership verification. Some other schemes [RMW12], [NWZ12], [PS12],
[ZX12] focused on improving the efficiency of POW and applying an encrypted file
scenario. In [PS12], Pietro and Sorniottis proposed three correlative protocols to
achieve an efficient POW for deduplication. The main idea of their protocols is to
challenge random K bits of file F . The probability that a malicious user is able to
output the correct value of K bits of the file where each bit is selected at a random
position is negligible in security parameter k, but their scheme cannot be adopted for
encrypted files. In addition, the client’s files are totally revealed to the cloud server
during the protocol executions. In [NWZ12], they presented a private POW scheme
for encrypted files in cloud storage. Zheng et al. [ZX12] argued that the public
verifiability offered by POR/PDP schemes could be naturally exploited to achieve
POW, however by using POR/PDP schemes to achieve POW, their scheme brings
the clients mass information because it stores all the verified tags. In addition, none
of the above schemes can solve the POW problem for multiparty users because the
protocol execution was only related to the file F that has to be proven.
There are applications of ownership sharing by different users. Thus an innovative proof of a multiparty ownership solution is proposed with the encrypted data
in the cloud. Every user can prove that he holds the plaintext of the encrypted file
when the server stores one ciphertext only.
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Summary of This Thesis

The definition and advantages of cloud computing are revised in this chapter. The
security issues in cloud computing are outlined, especially the security challenges
for data security in the cloud. In particular, the aims of this thesis are illustrated
and the contributions are summarized .
In Chapter 2, the notations and definitions which are used throughout this thesis
are covered. The preliminaries and review background materials are presented.
In Chapter 3, a privacy enhanced key management scheme in the cloud is given.
It allows a data source to be accessed by multiple parties who hold different rights.
The security of the database is remained, while some selected data sources can be
securely shared with other parties.
In Chapter 4, a solution is presented to achieve flexible and fine-grained access
control on outsourced data files. In particular, the problem of defining and assigning
keys to users is concerned. The access policies and users’ information are hidden from
third-party cloud servers. The proposed scheme is partially based on the observation
that, in practical application scenarios, each user can be associated with a set of
attributes which are meaningful in the access policy and data file context. The access
policy can thus be defined as a logical expression formula over different attribute
sets. The logical expression can indicate what kind of user is allowed to access
the data file. As any access policy can be represented as such a logical expression
formula, fine-grained access control can be accomplished.
In Chapter 5, an efficient keyword search scheme for cloud computing is proposed.
The proposed solution is very lightweight. It enables efficient multi-user keyword
searches over outsourced data files in the cloud environment, without leaking any
private information about either the data owner or users in the search query. The
security requirements are formally defined and the proposed scheme is proven secure
under a simple assumption in the standard model.
In Chapter 6, a privacy-preserving RIC protocol which achieves public verifiability without disclosing any information is proposed. No information about the
original data will be leaked. In fact, the verifier is only required to know the public
key of the data owner. The experimental results indicate that the proposed scheme
is efficient, especially when the data size is large or the integrity check is frequent.
The full proofs of security under the random oracle model is also given.
Chapter 7 deals with proof of ownership as an important data security issue in
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cloud computing, as mentioned earlier. There are many applications of ownership
sharing by different users. In this chapter, an innovative PMOW scheme for proof
of multiparty ownership is proposed, for encrypted data in the cloud. Every user
can prove that he holds the plaintext of the encrypted file when the server stores
one ciphertext only. The proposed solution achieves CCA2 security and The full
proof analysis is also given in the ideal cipher model.
Finally, the thesis is concluded in Chapter 8 with a summary of the thesis together with some possible future research directions.

Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, the notations and definitions which are used throughout this thesis
are covered. The aim of this chapter is to make this thesis self-contained. Background materials on the topic of hash function, pseudo-random function, numbertheoretic problems, bilinear maps, Merkle-tree protocols and zero-knowledge knowledgeof-proof protocols will be presented.

2.1
2.1.1

Preliminaries
Miscellaneous Notations

Notations. Throughout this thesis, N denotes the set of natural numbers {1, 2, · · · }
and by Z the set of integers {· · · , −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, · · · }. Zp denotes the set {0, · · · , p−
1} and Z∗p the set of positive integers smaller than p and relatively prime to p. That
is,
Z∗p = {n|1 6 n 6 p and gcd(n, p) = 1}.
The notation [1, k] denotes the set {1, · · · , k}.
Functions and Algorithms. Let f : X1 → X2 be the function f with input X1
and output X2 . Let A denote an algorithm. Let A(·) to denote that A has one input
and A(·, · · · , ·) to denote that A has several inputs. y ← A(x) denotes that y is the
output of algorithm A on input x.
Experiments. Let S be a probability distribution which is a graph, table or formula
that gives the probability for each value of the random variable. x ← S denotes the
experiment of sampling an element x from a probability distribution S. If F is a
finite set, then x ← F denotes the experiment of sampling uniformly from the set
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F . Semicolon is used to describe the ordered sequences of event that make up an
experiment, e.g.,
u ← S; (v, w) ← A(u)
Probabilities. If pre(., .) denotes a predicate, then
Pr[u ← S; (v, w) ← A(u) : pre(v, w)]
is the probability that the predicate pre(v, w) is true after the ordered sequence of
events (u ← S; (v, w) ← A(u)). The notation
{u ← S; (v, w) ← A(u) : (v, w)}
denotes the probability distribution over {v, w} generated by the experiment (u ←
S; (v, w) ← A(u)). Following standard notation,
Pr[A|B]
denotes the probability of event A conditioned on the event B. When the Pr[B] = 0,
then the conditional probability is not defined.
Big-O Notation. The standard asymptotic notation is used to describe the running
time of algorithms. The expression f (n) = O(g(n)) means that there exist some
positive constant c and a positive integer n0 such that 0 6 f (n) 6 cg(n) for all
n > n0 . Broadly speaking, it means that g is the upper bound of f . If f is bounder
below by g, that is, g(n) = O(f (n)), then f (n) = Ω(g(n)).

2.1.2

Complexity Problems on Zp

The security of many cryptosystems relies on the intractability of solving some hard
problems. In the following, three hard problems are described in detail. Let p be a
large prime and q a prime divisor of p − 1. Let G be a subgroup in Z∗p with prime
order q. Let g be the generator of G.
• Discrete Logarithm Problem. The discrete logarithm problem (DLP)
[BL96] forms the basis in the security of many cryptosystems. DLP is restricted in cyclic group in this thesis.
Definition 2.1 The Discrete Logarithm Problem in G is defined as follows:
On input a tuple (g, Y ) ∈ G2 , output x such that Y = g x .
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Shoup [Sho97] derived a lower bound on any algorithms that solve DLP without exploiting any special properties of the encoding of the group element.
Such algorithms are known as generic algorithms. Specifically, the lower bound
√
is Ω( d), where d is the largest prime dividing the order of the group. Indeed, such bound is met by the well-known Pollard’s rho algorithm [Pol78]
that works in arbitrary groups.
• Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem. If DLP in G can be solved,
the computation Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH) can also be solved although
whether the converse is true or not is still an open problem.
Definition 2.2 The Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem in G such that
|G| = p is defined as follows: On input a tuple (g, g x , g y ) ∈ G3 , output g xy .
• Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem. The decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH) is the decisional version of the CDH problem. It was first formally
introduced in [Bra93].
Definition 2.3 The Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem in G such that |G| =
p is defined as follows: On input a tuple (g, g x , g y , g z ) ∈ G4 , decide if g z = g xy .

2.1.3

Bilinear Maps

The necessary facts about bilinear maps and groups are briefly reviewed, in the
notation of [BLS04]: Let G1 and G2 be two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime
order p, with an additional group GT such that |G1 | = |G2 | = |GT |. A bilinear map
is a map e : G1 × G2 → GT with the following properties:
1. Bilinear: for all u ∈ G1 , v ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Z, e(ua , v b ) = e(u, v)ab .
2. Non-degenerate: for g1 is a generator of G1 and g2 is a generator of G2 ,
e(g1 , g2 ) 6= 1.
These properties imply another two properties: for any u1 , u2 ∈ G1 , v ∈ G2 ,
e(u1 u2 , v) = e(u1 , v) · e(u2 , v); and for any u, v ∈ G2 , and φ is a computable isomorphism from G2 to G1 , with φ(g2 ) = g1 , then e(φ(u), v) = e(φ(v), u).
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Cryptographic Tools

2.2.1

Cryptographic Hash Functions

A hash function, H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ is an efficient one-way algorithms that
maps an input of an arbitrary-length bit-string x to an output H(x) of fixed length
λ. The cryptographic hash functions must be efficiently computable. The hash
function is required to be pre-image resistant. That is, given a hash function H,
it is computationally hard to find x when given y, such that y = H(x). The
hash functions are also required to be collision resistant [Dam87]. That is, it is
computationally hard to find a pair x0 , x1 with x0 6= x1 , such that H(x0 ) = H(x1 ).

2.2.2

Pseudo-random Functions

A random function is a machine that upon receiving input x proceeds as follows.
If it has not seen x before, it chooses a value y ← {0, 1}n and returns y; it then
records that f (x) = y. If it has seen x before, then it looks up x, and outputs the
same value y as before.
Intuitively, a pseudo-random function (PRF) is like a random function to any
polynomial time adversary. It is originally defined by [GGM86] as an important
cryptographic primitive. They are deterministic functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
which are computable in polynomial time and take two inputs x, k ∈ {0, 1}n where
k is a hidden random seed. Naturally, a distribution of functions is pseudo-random
if it satisfies the following requirements [NRR00]:
• Easy to sample: It is easy to sample a function according to the distribution.
• Easy to compute: Given such a function, it is easy to evaluate it at any given
point.
• Pseudo-random: It is hard to tell apart a function sampled according to the
pseudo-random distribution form a uniformly distributed function when the
distinguisher is given access to the function as a black-box.
Theorem 2.1 If a pseudorandom generator exists, then pseudo-random functions
exist.
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Pseudo-random functions have a wide range of applications, most notably in
cryptography, but also in computational complexity and computational learning
theory.

2.2.3

Public Key Encryption Scheme

In a public key encryption scheme, the public key is published in a secure repository,
where anyone can use it to encrypt messages. The private key is kept by the recipient
so that only he can decrypt massages which are sent to him.
Definition 2.4 (Public key encryption scheme) A triple of algorithms (Gen, Enc,
Dec) is a public key encryption scheme if
• (pk, sk) ← Gen(1n ) is a polynomial time algorithm that produces a key pair
(pk, sk).
• c ← Endpk (m) is a polynomial time algorithm that given pk and m ∈ {0, 1}n
produces a ciphertext c.
• m ← Decsk (c) is a deterministic algorithm that given a ciphertext c and secret
key sk produces a message m ∈ {0, 1}n ∪ ⊥.
• There exists a polynomial time algorithm A that on input (1n , i), outputs the
ith n-bit message (if such a message exists) according to some order.
• For all n ∈ N, m ∈ {0, 1}n ,
Pr[(pk, sk) ← Gen(1n ) : Decsk (Encpk (m)) = m] = 1.
The decryption algorithm is allowed to produce a special symbol ⊥ when the
input ciphertext is undecipherable. The security property for public key encryption
can be defined as follows.
Definition 2.5 (Secure public key encryption) The public key encryption scheme
(Gen, End, Dec) is said to be secure if for all non uniform polynomial time
distinguisher D, there exists a negligible function (·) such that for all n ∈ N,
m0 , m1 ∈ {0, 1}n , D distinguishes between the following distributions with probability at most (n):
• {(pk, sk) ← Gen(1n ) : (pk, Encpk (m0 ))}n .
• {(pk, sk) ← Gen(1n ) : (pk, Encpk (m1 ))}n .
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Commitment Schemes

Commitment schemes are usually referred to as the digital equivalent of a “physical”
locked box. They consist of two phases:
• Commit phase: Sender puts a value x in a locked box.
• Reveal phase: Sender unlocks the box and reveals x.
It is required that before the reveal phase the value x should remain hidden:
this property is called hiding. Additionally, during the reveal phase, there should
only exists a single value that the commitment can be revealed to: this property
is called binding. In the following, a formalization of single-message commitments
is provided, where both the commit and the reveal phases only consist of a single
message sent from the committer to the receiver.
Definition 2.6 (Commitment) A polynomial time machine Com is called a commitment scheme if there exists some polynomial l(·) such that the following two
properties hold:
• Binding. For all n ∈ N and all x0 , x1 ∈ {0, 1}n , r0 , r1 ∈ {0, 1}l(n) , it holds
that Com(x0 , r0 ) 6= Com(x0 , r1 ).
• Hiding. For every non uniform polynomial time distinguisher D, there exists a
negligible function  such that for every n ∈ N, x0 , x1 ∈ {0, 1}n , D distinguishes
the following distributions with probability at most (n).
– {r ← {0, 1}l(n) : Com(x0 , r)}.
– {r ← {0, 1}l(n) : Com(x1 , r)}.
Theorem 2.2 If one-way permutations exist, then commitment schemes exist.

2.2.5

Sequences of Games

Sequences of games [Sho04] is a tool for organizing the security proofs. To prove
security using the sequence-of-games approach, it is needed to proceed as follows.
• Construct. Construct a sequence of games, Game 0, Game 1, · · · , Game n,
where Game 0 is the original attack game with respect to a given adversary
and cryptographic primitive.
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• Define. Let S0 be the event S, and for i = 1, · · · , n, the construction defines
an event Si in Game i, usually in a way naturally related to the definition of
S.
• Proof. The proof shows that Pr[Si ] is negligibly close to Pr[Si+1 ] for i =
0, · · · , n − 1, and that Pr[Sn ] is equal (or negligibly close) to the target probability.
From the above and fact that n is a constant, it follows that Pr[S] is negligibly
close to the target probability. Then the security is proved.
However, the above procession is the general framework of such a security proof.
In constructing such proofs, it is desirable that the changes between successive games
are very small, so that analyzing the change is as simple as possible. Shoup [Sho04]
presented that the transitions between successive games can be restricted to one of
three types: indistinguishability, failure events and bridging steps. Throughout this
thesis, it is restricted on the type of transitions based on indistinguishability.
Transitions Based on Indistinguishability [Sho04]. Suppose D1 and D2 are
two computational indistinguishable distributions. To prove | Pr[Si ] − Pr[Si+1 ]| is
negligible, one argues that there exist a distinguishing algorithm A that interpolates
between Game i and Game i + 1. When A is given an element which is selected from
distribution D1 , it outputs 1 with probability Pr[Si ]. When A is given an element
which is selected from distribution D2 , it outputs 1 with probability Pr[Si+1 ]. Then
the indistinguishability assumption implies that | Pr[Si ] − Pr[Si+1 ]| is negligible.
Typically, one can design the two games so that they could easily be rewritten as
a single ‘hybrid’ game that takes an auxiliary input. One get Game i if the auxiliary
input is drawn from D1 and get Game i + 1 if the auxiliary input is drawn from D2 .
The distinguisher algorithm A then simply runs the hybrid game with its input and
outputs 1 if the appropriate event occurs.

2.3

Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Knowledge

Proof of Knowledge. In a proof of knowledge protocol[ASM10], the prover attempts to convince the verifier that it knows a certain quantity satisfying some kinds
of relation with respect to a commonly known string. For example, given the publicly known value y = g x , the prover attempts convince the verifier that it knows
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x.
To define a proof of knowledge, the NP-relation R is first defined as follows.
Definition 2.7 An NP-relation R ⊆ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ is given by a deterministic
algorithm W (·, ·) that runs in time polynomial in the length of its first input. The
relation is:
R = {(x, w) : W (x, w)accepts}.
The associated NP-language LR = {x : ∃w such that W (x, w) accepts}. The witness
set for an x ∈ {0, 1}∗ is R(x) = {w : W (x, w) = 1}.
That is, the NP-relation R is just the set of theorem-witness pairs (x, w) that are
accepted by the verifier W . It is easily seen that the language LR associated with
the relation is an NP language. For example, for the discrete logarithm problem in
G, the natural relation is R = {(x ∈ G, w ∈ Zp ) : g w = x}.
A proof of knowledge for a relation R is now defined. The definition captures
the intuition that form any (possible cheating) prover P ∗ that is able to convince
the verifier with good enough probability on a statement x ∈ LR , there is a way to
extract a valid witness for x from P ∗ with a related (not too small) probability.
Definition 2.8 An interactive proof system (P, V ) is a proof of knowledge with
knowledge error k ∈ [0, 1] for an NP-relation R if there exists an n.u.p.p.t oracle
machine K (the knowledge extractor) such that for any x ∈ LR , and for any (possible
unbounded) P ∗ for which p∗x = Pr [outV [P ∗ ↔ V (x)] = 1] > k, it has
 ∗

Pr K P (x) ∈ R(x) > poly(p∗x − k).
That is, the probability that the knowledge extractor K finds a valid witness for x
using its access to prover P ∗ is at least polynomially related to the probability p∗x
that P ∗ convinces the honest verifier on x, unless some knowledge error.
Zero-Knowledge Proof. In a zero-knowledge proof protocol that was first introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR89], a prover convinces a verifier that
some statement is true without the verifier learning anything except the validity of
the statement.
Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Knowledge (ZKPoK). ZKPoK is a proof of knowlP
edge protocol which is zero-knowledge. -protocols are a special type of three-move
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ZKPoK protocols, which can be converted into non-interactive Signature Proof of
Knowledge (SPK) schemes or simply signature schemes [GMR88] that are secure in
the random oracle (RO) model [BR93, CGH04]. Let P K{(x) : y = g x } denote a
P
-protocol that proves the knowledge of x ∈ Zp such that y = g x for some y ∈ G
[CS03]. The x value on the left of the colon denotes variable whose knowledge is to
be proven, while other values on denote publicly known value.

Chapter 3
Privacy Enhanced Data Outsourcing in
the Cloud
How to secure outsourcing data in cloud computing is a challenging problem, since
a public cloud environment cannot been considered to be trusted. The situation
becomes even more challenging when outsourced data sources in a cloud environment are managed by multiple outsourcers who have different access levels. In
this chapter, an efficient and innovative tree-based key management scheme is introduced, which allows a data source to be accessed by multiple parties who hold
different rights. It is ensured that the database remains secure, while some selected
data sources can be securely shared with other parties. The original scheme was
presented at Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 2012 [ZMS+ 12].

3.1

Introduction

Cloud Storage Services such as Microsoft’s Azure storage and Amazon’s S3 have
gained popularity recently. While more and more enterprises store their private data
on the cloud storages, which are generally managed by untrusted parties, secure and
privacy have become major concerns. As a countermeasure, Microsoft has recently
deployed a virtual private storage service [KL10]. Although the recent efforts in
secure cloud computing, there are a number of unsolved security issues. One of such
issues is the confidentiality and privacy of user data, while those data has to be
shared/managed by multiple parties. This is also the issue to be addressed in this
chapter.
The data stored in a cloud database is considered as data outsourcing, since they
are managed by an external party. For security, those data are generally encrypted
so that only authorized users can access them. Generally, outsourced data consist
of many data blocks, hence the management of encryption keys is a major challenge
23
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as mentioned in Chapter 1.
The classical tree-based hierarchy schemes such as RFC2627 [WHA99]) and the
scheme proposed by Wong et al. [WGL98] have been widely used in group key
management. In RFC2627 [WHA99], the hierarchical tree approach is the recommended approach to address the multicast key management problem. This approach
provides for the following requisite features: 1)provides for the secure removal of a
compromised user from the multicast group, 2)provides for transmission efficiency,
3)provides for storage efficiency. The hierarchical tree approach balances the costs
of time, storage and number of required message transmissions, using a hierarchical
system of auxiliary keys to facilitate distribution of new key. The result is that the
storage requirement for each user and the transmissions required for key replacement
are both logarithmic in the number of users, with no background transmissions required. This approach is robust against collusion of excluded users. Moreover, while
the scheme is hierarchical in nature, no infrastructure is needed beyond a server (e.g.,
a root), though the presence of such elements could be used to advantage.
Many key management methods of access hierarchies for data outsourcing have
been proposed based on this approach[WLOB09, DdVJ+ 03, BCdV+ 09, dVFJ+ 07a,
ABFF09, PL01]. These methods provide some useful solutions to minimize the
number of cryptographic keys, which have to be managed and stored. Aiming
to provide secure and efficient access to outsourced data, Wang et al.[WLOB09]
proposed a tree-based cryptographic key management scheme for data storages in
the cloud. They referred the scenario to as “owner-write-users-read”. Their treebased key management structure was similar to a traditional one, where a single
root node held the master key that could be used to derive other node keys. Each
node key could be used to derive the keys of its children in the hierarchy. With
their scheme, a data block stored in the cloud can be updated by a party who holds
either the specific decryption key or a node key corresponding to one of its parents.
If there is an outsourcing server authorized to manage a node (not the root node)
that has several child nodes, then the outsourced party is granted the node key, which
can be used to derive all sub-keys for its child nodes. In another word, once a parent
node in the tree is given, all the child nodes wll be known. This is a common problem
which exists in many tree-based key management schemes. Existing ones such as
[WLOB09, DdVF+ 05, DdVF+ 07, dVFJ+ 08, dVFJ+ 07b, AFB05, YLZL01, KPT00,
NNL01a, LNS03, KLKJ06, SL04, BSS11] can work perfectly, only if all legitimate
users are authorized to access all the child nodes under the specific parent node.
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Considering this problem, a practical application is suggested for private data
management. It is named as OWUR/W (owner-write-users-read/write) applications, where a data source protected with a node key in a key management tree can
be shared with or managed by another party without compromising the security of
the data encrypted with its child nodes’ keys. Additionally, data can be updated
not only by the data owner, but also by other legitimate parties. It is found that
this scenario is very useful in outsourcing management. Meanwhile, it is noticed
that other existing schemes do not offer this feature.
Intuitively, it is necessary that the encrypted data block associated with a node
can be decrypted by multiple decryption keys where one of them is associated with
the tree and can be utilized to generate its keys children’s keys, while other decryption keys are only used to decrypt the data block stored in the node. Let us assume
two decryption keys (d1 , d2 ), assigned to a node, where one of them is associated
with the tree (let us assume that d1 is the key associated with the tree and d2 is
known to the manager only). Both decryption keys are associated with the unique
encryption key, e. For a user, who is authorized to access only the data block stored
in the node and should not have to access its children, the manager only grant d2
to the user. With d2 , the user can decrypt the data block but can not generate
the decryption keys of this node’s children. It is believed that this method offers
additional privacy protection to the outsourced data.
In this chapter, an innovative tree-based key management scheme is proposed.
The proposed scheme can indeed capture the idea given above. It is also shown how
apply the proposed scheme to protect outsourced data in cloud computing.
Organization of This Chapter. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
In the next section, the data outsourcing model for cryptographic cloud storage
is presented. In Section 3.3 , the key derivation hierarchy for key management in
cloud storage is described. In Section 3.4, a concrete example is given and the
main construction is presented, including the encryption method and the detailed
algorithms. In Section 3.5, the data access procedure is analyzed. In Section 3.6, an
extension of the proposed scheme is discussed. The security proof of the proposed
scheme is given in Section 3.7 and Section 3.8 concludes this chapter.
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The Model

In this section, the data outsourcing model is presented, following the application
scenario presented in Section 3.1. An illustration of the proposed model is presented
in Figure 3.1. The system consists of four major parties:
• The cloud Provider (P), who provides third-party data storage services.
• The original data owner (O), who holds the master (root) key and is responsible to set up the key management system.
• The sub-tree data manager (M), who holds an authorized node key, which
can be used to derive all decryption keys for its child nodes. Notice that it
is assumed each node has two decryption keys: one can be used to derive all
decryption keys of its children and the other can only be used to decrypt the
encrypted data in the specific node.
• A user or another sub-tree data manager (U), who probably use or share a
data block at a node managed by M but does not hold the full administrative
right of deriving the decryption keys of the children of this node.

O

Root Node
(d0)

(dijk)
Node N(i+1)j
accessed by U

......
P

Sub-tree
managed
by M

Figure 3.1: The data outsourcing model.
The encryption method is asymmetric, in the sense that the encryption key and
decryption key(s) are different. For simplicity, it is assumed that the data stored in
each node is encrypted by one encryption key associated with two decryption keys.
One of these two decryption keys is used for the decryption of the database located
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at the corresponding node and the generation of sub-keys for the child nodes, while
another one can only be used for the decryption of the database at the same node.
Let eij denote encryption keys and dijk the corresponding decryption keys, respectively, where i denotes the level of a tree, j the index of nodes and k the index
of decryption keys. The root master key is denoted by d0 . Let Nij denote a node in
the tree. Using a binary tree as an example, the proposed model can be described
as follows:
• The original owner O generates a master (root) key, d0 , which can be used to
derive all other decryption keys and encryption keys in a tree.
• Each node in the tree obtains a master decryption key dij1 and the secondary
decryption key dij2 , generated from the root key. The secondary decryption
key dij2 is derived from dij1 .
• The sub-tree data manager M obtains a key dij1 as its master key, which can
be used to generate all node keys of the sub-tree, including the secondary keys.
• User U can request a secondary decryption key dij2 from M for accessing the
encrypted data stored in node Nij .
This key management scheme holds all features from a normal binary tree hierarchy and introduces the new secondary key, which enables flexibility in key management and additional privacy protection.

3.3

Key Derivation Hierarchy

Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the outsourced data contains n blocks
and 2(i−1) 6 n 6 2i where i denotes the level of the tree. Therefore, a complete
binary tree from Node N0 to Nij is constructed, where i and j denote the level of a
tree and j the node index, respectively.
Before defining the key derivation tree, Key Value is first defined.
Definition 3.1 (Key Value) Except the root node N0 , any node Nij in the key
derivation tree T, has a key value Kij of two decryption keys dij1 and dij2 . These
two decryption keys are also denoted as key pair (dij1 ,dij2 ). Such a key pair can
generate the encryption key eij for this node.
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The definition of Key Derivation Tree is given as follows. Notice that the encryption key associated with a key value is less important in the key derivation.
Definition 3.2 (Key Derivation Tree) A key derivation tree, denoted T, is a
tree T = hN, Ki, rooted at vertex N0 . Any node Nij except the leaves, can derive its
child nodes of indices i(2j − 1) (for the left) and i(2j) (for the right), for i = 1, 2, ...
and j = 1, ..., 2i, while its parent (if any) is found at index (i − 1)d 2j e. Kij ⊆ K,
denotes the key value of each node Nij , where the key value consists of a set of
decryption keys corresponding to this node.
To construct the key derivation tree, a cryptographic one-way hash function is
chosen as the key generation function: H : {0, 1}∗ → ZZq , which can be used to
compute the decryption key of child nodes of any node Nij , while hard to invert the
key of Nij . The key value Kij of node Nij is represented by Kij ← (dij1 , dij2 ) where
dij1 denotes the master decryption key and dij2 denotes the secondary decryption
key. The one-way hash function H is also being used to compute dij2 from the input
dij1 : dij2 ← H(dij1 ). The key derivation hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 3.2, where
i > 0, j > 1.

d0

e11

(d111, d112)
(d211, d212)

(d121, d122)

(d221, d222) (d231, d232)

e12
key
derivation
hierarchy

(d241, d242)

(d(i-1)11, d(i-1)22)

(d(i-1) (j/2 1, d(i-1) (j/2 2)

(di11, di12)

(di21, di22)

(di(j-1)1, di(j-1)2)

(dij1, dij2)

ei1

ei2

ei(j-1)

eij

Figure 3.2: Key derivation hierarchy.
With the root key d0 for node N0 , all the key pairs can be derived:
d0 → d111 → d112 ,

d0 → d121 → d122 .
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d111 → d211 → d212 ,

d111 → d221 → d222 .

d121 → d231 → d232 ,

d121 → d241 → d242 .

...

...

d(i−1)d j e1 → di(j−1)1 → di(j−1)2 , d(i−1)d j e1 → dij1 → dij2
2

2

...

...

The encryption keys are generated from key pairs which contain the master
decryption key and the secondary decryption key, for example,
(d111 , d112 ) → e11 ,

(d121 , d122 ) → e12 ,

(d211 , d212 ) → e21 ,

(d221 , d222 ) → e22 ,

...

...

(di(j−1) , di(j−1)2 ) → ei(j−1) ,
...

(dij1 , dij2 ) → eij

...

To derive child keys, the original data owner O conducts the following computations. For a key pair (dij1 ,dij2 ) of node (i, j), its child on the left can be calculated
as
(d(i+1)(2j−1)1 , d(i+1)(2j−1)2 ) = (H(dij1 k(2j − 1)), H(H(dij1 k(2j − 1)))).
and its child on the right can be calculated as
(d(i+1)(2j)1 , d(i+1)(2j)2 ) = (H(dij1 k2j), H(H(dij1 k2j))).
Other sub-keys can be generated accordingly. In this way, the whole key derivation tree can be constructed. A concrete scheme will also be given in the following
section.

3.4

The Concrete Scheme

Having demonstrated how the proposed scheme works, a concrete construction is
now provided. The polynomial introduced in [MVN99] is borrowed and it is demonstrated how to apply it to the proposed key derivation tree.
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The Polynomial Function

The security of this system relies on difficulty of computing discrete logarithm. The
protocols are based on a polynomial function and a set of exponentials. Let p, q be
two large prime numbers such that q|p − 1, and g ∈ Z∗p be a generator of order q.
Let {xi } ∈R Zq for i = 0, 1, 2..., n be a set of integers. The polynomial function of
order n is constructed as follows.
f (x) =

Qn

i=1 (x

− xi ) ≡

Pn

i=0

ai xi mod q,

where {ai } are coefficients:
a0

n
Y
=
(−xj ),

a1

n Y
n
X
(−xj ),
=

j=1

i=1 i6=j

an−2

··· ,
n
X
=
(−xi )(−xj ),
i6=j

an−1 =

n
X

(−xj ),

i=1

an = 1.
It is noted that

Pn

i=0

ai xij = 0. This property is important for the proposed scheme.

Having the set {ai }, the corresponding exponential functions can be constructed,
{g a0 , g a1 , · · · , g an } ≡ {g0 , g1 , · · · , gn } mod p.
All elements here are computed under modulo p. For convenience, modulo p will be
omitted in the rest of this paper.
Now it is ready to construct an asymmetric-key system where the encryption key
is the tuple {g0 , g1 , · · · , gn } mapping to n decryption keys {xi }.

3.4.2

Key Derivation Tree and Data Encryption

Let us use a binary tree as an example and (i, j) as an arbitrary node. Then the main
construction contains four algorithms: Key Generation, Encryption, Decryption and
Key Derivation.
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Key Generation
The decryption keys are denoted by (dij1 , dij2 ), which correspond to (x1 , x2 ) in the 2degree polynomial defined above, where dij2 = H(dij1 ). For simplicity, it is denoted
that (dij1 , dij2 ) = (d1 , d2 ). The encryption key corresponding to (d1 , d2 ) is e =
(g0 , g1 , g2 ), where g0 = g a0 = g d1 d2 , g1 = g a1 = g −(d1 +d2 ) , g2 = g a2 = g. For
simplicity, the subscripts of eij is omitted.
Encryption
The encryption algorithm takes as input a message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ , the encryption key
e, a random k ∈ Zq , and a generator h ∈ Z∗p , and outputs a ciphertext (c1 , c2 ), where
c1 ← (hk · g0k , g1k , g2k ),

c2 = M · hk .

Rewrite c1 as (b1 , b2 , b3 ) for convenience. The encryption scheme is a variant of
ElGamal encryption, which is proven to be secure under the assumption of Chosen
Plaintext Attack when the group Z∗p is properly selected. It can be easily converted
into Chosen Ciphertext Security by Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [FO99].
Decryption
This algorithm takes as input the ciphertext (c1 , c2 ) and one of decryption keys d1
2

and d2 , and outputs M . hk can be computed from b1 · bd2i · bd3i , for i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus,
M can be computed as M = c2 /hk .
Key Derivation
This algorithm takes as input the master decryption key dij1 and a one way hash
function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq . It outputs the two child nodes of key dij1 . During the
key derivation procedure, the left child node can be computed as
(d(i+1)(2j−1)1 , d(i+1)(2j−1)2 ) = (H(dij1 k(2j − 1)), H(H(dij1 k(2j − 1)))),
and the right child node can be computed as
(d(i+1)(2j)1 , d(i+1)(2j)2 ) = (H(dij1 k2j), H(H(dij1 k2j))).
By repeating this algorithm, the whole key derivation tree can be generated.
The proposed scheme also considers “Write” applications and allows the user
to re-encrypt the data. This means that the encryption key e should be given to
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the user. The reader might think that the user could alter the encryption key by
changing a new encryption key, as he can easily replace his existing decryption key
with a different one. However, this action will fail if the data manager checks the
correctness of the encryption regularly. An alternative solution is to use an RSA
modulus and assume that two corresponding primes, which form the modulus, is
only known to the manager. This change makes the encryption key inviolable.

3.5

Data Access Procedure

In this section, the data access procedure is described for four associated parties
given in Section 3.2. Here some notations are first given.
• M, O, P, U: abbreviated names appear as the four major parties as given in
the proposed model.
• M → O: m. M sends message m to O.
• kXY : a symmetric key shared between parties X and Y .
• TX : a timestamp generated by X;
Using Nij as example, the data block is encrypted with eij , which is corresponding
to two decryption keys (dij1 , dij2 ). The data access procedure is described in two
phases, shown in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4.

3.5.1

The First Phase

In the first phase, Data Owner O, Sub-tree Manager M and Cloud Provider P
execute the following five steps.
1. M sends O a key request message: M REQ, where M REQ = {sub id, TM ,
MAC(kM O , sub id, TM )}. MAC denotes the message authentication code with
the key kM O shared by M and O. After the original data owner O sets up
the system, the first step in the data access procedure are run by O and its
sub-tree data manager M. M sends O an access request message M REQ
in order to obtain the sub-tree root key. The sub id field in this message
provides the index of the sub-tree root node. Upon receiving the M REQ
message, O performs data-integrity validation by checking the MAC of sub id
and timestamp.
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M
(Sub-tree
Manager)

O
(Data Owner)

P
(Cloud
Provider)

(1) key request message
(2) O sends M the sub-tree root key
(3) data access request message
(4) encrypted data blocks
(5) data updating

Figure 3.3: The first phase.
2. O sends M the sub-tree root key dij1 encrypted with EkM O . Upon receiving
dij1 , M can use it to derive the second key and other keys of its child nodes
and access the the encrypted data block as given in the next step.
3. M sends P an access request message: M REQ, where M REQ = {sub tree id,
TM , MAC(kM P , sub tree id, TM )}
4. M accesses the stored data block.
5. With the sub-tree root key dij1 for Nij , M can update all the sub-tree nodes.
this sub-procedure is called as a write step because M can modify and more importantly, re-encrypt the sub-tree data. After that, M sends the re-encrypted
data block back to P.

3.5.2

The Second Phase

In the second phase, User U, Data Owner O and Cloud Provider P execute the
following five steps:
1. U sends M a key request message: U REQ, where U REQ = {req id, TU ,
MAC(kM U , req id, TU )}. This step runs between User U and the sub-tree
data manager M. Without any interaction with the original data owner O,
the user U starts the connection by sending a key request message U REQ to
the sub-tree manager M. MAC is the message authentication code using the
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P
(Cloud
Provider)

(1) key request message
(2) M sends U the required dij2
(3) data access request message
(4) encrypted data blocks
(5) user updates the data

Figure 3.4: The second process.
key kM U . The req id field contains the node information for U. U performs
data-integrity validation with the MAC, upon receiving the U REQ message.
2. M sends U the secondary decryption key dij2 with respect to the same node.
U can use this decryption key to decrypt the same data block. If U is a
legitimate user that can write the data, M also provides the encryptions key
eij corresponding to this node.
3. U sends P an access request: U REQ = {req node id, TU , MAC(kU P , req node id,
TU )}.
4. U accesses the encrypted data block.
5. Given the encryption key eij , U can update this specific data node. this subprocedure is called as a user write step where a legitimate user can modify and
re-encrypt the specific data block.

3.6

Generalization of Key Derivation Hierarchy

A flexible and efficient key management scheme should be adaptable and expandable
for different application scenarios. For this consideration, the proposed scheme
is expanded into multiple branches and multiple sub-keys respectively. Then a
generalized key derivation hierarchy is given with a consideration of both cases.
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Multiple Branches

The proposed scheme can be expanded easily for multiple branches (m > 2) as
Figure 3.5.
d0
e11

(d111, d112)
(d121, d122)
(d131, d132)
(d1m1, d1m2)

e1m

(d2[m(m-1)+1]1, d2[m(m-1)+1]2)
(d2[m(m-1)+2]1, d2[m(m-1)+2]2)

(d2( m2)1, d2( m2)2)

Figure 3.5: A key derivation tree with multiple branches.
Every parent node has m child nodes which can be derived in a similar way.
Taking parent node (d1m1 , d1m2 ) as an example, its first child node (d2[m(m−1)+1]1 ,
d2[m(m−1)+1]2 ) can be computed as (H(d1m1 ||[m(m1 ) + 1]), H(H(d1m1 ||[m(m1 ) +
1]))), and its last child node (d2(m2 )1 , d2(m2 )2 ) can be computed as (H(d1m1 ||m2 ,
H(H(d1m1 ||m2 ))). This expansion lowers the level of derivation hierarchy, by increasing the number of nodes in each level.

3.6.2

Multiple Sub-keys

It can also be expanded to n sub-keys (n > 2), where these sub-keys map to a single
encryption key used to encryption the corresponding data block. In regard to node
Nij , this n sub-keys are denoted by (dij1 ,dij2 ,...,dijn ) and the encryption key by eij .
Every decryption key can be used to decrypt the data block, while only the master
decryption key dij1 can derive n sub-keys in the tree.
Taking n = 3 as an example (shown in Figure 3.6), the decryption keys are
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d0
e11

(d111, d112, d113)

(d121, d122, d123)

e12

(d211, d212, d213) (d221, d222, d222) (d231, d232, d233) (d241, d242, d243)
(d(i-1)11, d(i-1)22, d(i-1)23)
(di11, di12, di13)

(di21, di22, di23)

(di(j-1)1, di(j-1)2, di(j-1)3)

(dij1, dij2, dij3)

ei1

ei2

ei(j-1)

eij

Figure 3.6: Take n = 3 as an example.
denoted by (dij1 ,dij2 ,dij3 ), which correspond to (x1 , x2 , x3 ) in the 3-degree polynomial defined in Section 3.4, where dij2 = H(dij1 ||1), dij3 = H(dij1 ||2). Denote (dij1 , dij2 , dij3 ) by (d1 , d2 , d3 ), the encryption key corresponding to (d1 , d2 , d3 )
is e = (g0 , g1 , g2 , g3 ), where g0 = g a0 = g −d1 d2 d3 , g1 = g a1 = g d1 d2 +d1 d3 +d2 d3 ,
g2 = g a2 = g −(d1 +d2 +d3 ) , g3 = g a3 = g.
Combining both cases above, a generalized key derivation tree can be given. An
m-branch n sub-key derivation tree is presented in Figure 3.7.

3.7
3.7.1

Proof and Analysis
Security Natation

The informal definition of the security property is first given. A construction of
encryption system must possess this security property.
Confidentiality. Entities (including the cloud server) other than the authorized
users should not be able to learn anything about the underlying plaintext message.
Definition 3.3 (Security) A construction of the encryption system is secure if it
holds confidentiality.
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d0
e11

(d111, d112,…, d11u)

(d121, d122,…, d12u)

(d1m1, d1m2, …, d1mu)

e1m

(d2[m(m-1)+1]1, d2[m(m-1)+1]2, …, d2[m(m-1)+1]u)
(d2[m(m-1)+2]1, d2[m(m-1)+2]2, …, d2[m(m-1)+2]u)

(d2( m2)1, d2( m2)2,…, d2( m2)u)

e 2(m 2 )

Figure 3.7: Expanding to M-Branch N-Tuple Hierarchy.

3.7.2

Security Model

The security requirement is formalized by the following security game. The adversary A models a malicious user or a cloud server which is Byzantine, i.e., can behave
arbitrarily, however, cannot collude with authorized users. Let C be the challenger.
Then the game runs as follows:
Setup Phase C sets up the encryption system and makes all public parameters in
the system available to A.
Query Phase 1 The adversary A can make at most qs queries to an encryption oracle, providing some message mi during each query. C then computes the ciphertext
CTmi and sends it back to A.
Challenge Phase The adversary A submits two messages (M0 , M1 ) of equal length.
Then the Challenger C flips a fair coin b ∈R {0, 1} and encrypts message Mb . The
ciphertext is then passed to A.
Query Phase 2 A can issue queries as in Query Phase 1 except it cannot submit
queries with input M0 and M1 .
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Output Phase Eventually A outputs a guess b∗ of b. A wins if and only if b∗ = b.
The advantage of an adversary A in this game is defined as Pr[b∗ = b] − 1/2.

3.7.3

Proof of Security

Theorem 3.1 The encryption scheme is secure if DDH problem in Z∗p is hard.
Proof:
It will be shown that the proposed scheme is secure under the assumption of
Chosen Plaintext Attack if the DDH problem is hard in Z∗p . Let S be a game
simulator. Suppose there exist a polynomial-time adversary A that can attack the
proposed scheme in the standard model with advantage /2. The simulator S is
given a DDH problem instance (g, g α , g β , R) from the DDH challenger generated in
the following process. The challenger flips a fair binary coin µ, outside of S’s view.
It sets the problem instance as (g, g α , g β , R) where R = g αβ if µ = 0 or R is a
random group element if µ = 1. The goal of S is to output the value µ.
• Setup Phase The simulator S chooses public parameters. S generates the
keys (d1 , d2 , e). S sets h = g k for some random value k.
• Query Phase 1 The adversary A can make queries for encrypting the message
m. S returns with the ciphertext CTm .
• Challenge Phase A will submit two challenge messages M0 and M1 to S. S
flips a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1} and sets d1 = α. The encryption key is then (g a0 ,
g a1 , g a2 ) such that each aj = uj · α + vj for some know uj and vj for j = 0, 1, 2.
Thus, g aj can be computed by S as (g α )uj g vj ). S returns an encryption of Mb
as follows:
(
CT =

c1 ← (g β )k · Ru0 · (g β )v0 , Ru1 · (g β )v1 , Ru2 · (g β )v2
c2 = Mb · (g β )k

If µ = 0, R = g αβ . Then by inspection, the ciphertext is a valid ciphertext for
message Mb , with the randomness r = β.
If µ = 1, then R is just a random group element. Thus the ciphertext is just
a random element and the ciphertext contains no information about Mb .
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• Query Phase 2 S acts exactly as it did in Query Phase 1 except for messages
M0 and M1 .
• Output Phase A will submit b∗ of b. If b∗ = b, the simulator will output
µ∗ = 0 to indicate that it was given a valid DDH triple; otherwise, it will
output µ∗ = 1 to indicate it was given a random element triple.
In the case where µ = 1, the adversary gains no information about b. Therefore,
Pr[b∗ = b|µ = 1] = 12 . Since the simulator guesses µ∗ = 1 when b∗ 6= b, Pr[µ∗ =
µ|µ = 1] = 21 . If µ = 0 then the adversary sees an encryption of Mb . The adversary’s
advantage in this situation is  by assumption. Therefore, Pr[b∗ = b|µ = 0] =
∗

∗

∗

Since the simulator guesses µ = 0 when b = b, Pr[µ = µ|µ = 0] =
The overall advantage of the simulator in the DDH game is:
0] + 21 Pr[µ∗ = µ|µ = 1] −
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Conclusion

Key management and access control are important for secure cloud computing. As a
traditional approach, tree-based key management has attracted a lot of attention. It
is found that a traditional tree-based approach had some drawbacks. In a traditional
tree-based key management hierarchy, a node key holder can derive all the child node
keys. In order to solve this problem and maintain the key management feature, in
this chapter, OWUR/W applications are proposed for data sourcing. A secure
and flexible tree-based key derivation hierarchy is presented. The proposed scheme
allowed the outsourcing party to access the data block located at a specified node,
while he could not access the data blocks encrypted with child keys. It is believed
that the proposed tree-based outsourcing key management opens up an entirely new
approach for secure and flexible key management.

Chapter 4
Piracy-Preserved Access Control for
Cloud Computing
The problem of access control on outsourced data to ‘honest but curious’ cloud
servers has received considerable attention, especially in scenarios involving potentially huge sets of data files, where re-encryption and re-transmission by the data
owner may not be acceptable. Considering the user privacy and data security in
cloud environment, in this chapter, a solution is proposed to achieve flexible and
fine-grained access control on outsourced data files. In particular, the problem of
defining and assigning keys to users is concerned. The access policies and users’
information are hidden to the third-party cloud servers. The proposed scheme is
partially based on the observation that, in practical application scenarios each user
can be associated with a set of attributes which are meaningful in the access policy
and data file context. The access policy can thus be defined as a logical expression
formula over different attribute sets to reflect the scope of data files that the kind
of users is allowed to access. As any access policy can be represented using a logical
expression formula, fine-grained access control can be accomplished. The original
scheme was presented at Trustcomm, 2012 [ZMSY11].

4.1

Introduction

Cloud computing is a new computing infrastructure for hosting data and deploying
services and has drawn extensive attention from both academia and industry. Cloud
computing is regarded as an infrastructure for delivering computing power, where
cloud users can use third-party resources through networks and save their investments significantly by migrating their businesses into the cloud. Due to its low cost,
robustness and ubiquitous nature, cloud computing is changing the way entities
store and manage their data. Outsourcing data to cloud servers can offer a number
40
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of benefits to cloud users, including low capital expenditures, dynamic provisioning
and economies of scale. While this infrastructure, exemplified by Microsoft’s Azure
Service Platform, Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3), Amazon’s Elastic Compute
Cloud (EC2), and Rackspace’s Mosso has already provides well known examples, it
has also encountered new security risks.
As more and more sensitive data are shared and stored in the cloud, data security
and privacy have been considered as a thorniest problem that may impede the growth
of cloud computing. Since all the resources are provided over the Internet, the cloud
becomes a single point of access for all the users. Fine-grained data access control
can play an important role on data security.
Recently, the problem of access management on outsourced data to cloud servers
has received considerable attention and several advancements have already been
proposed [LZC+ 10, LWG11, CSK11, BLLS11, ZLS11, Lee12, ZHA+ 12, WeLD12,
ASB+ 12, YLJ12, SWYW12, GM09, HYJZ09].

An existing feasible solution to

achieve fine-grained access control of outsourced data in cloud computing is to encrypt the data through certain cryptographic primitives and only disclose the private
keys to authorized users. Without the appropriate decryption keys, unauthorized
users including the cloud providers, cannot decrypt the data. This solution has
been widely used (such as [dVFJ+ 07b, KRS+ 03]) and most schemes using it are
deployed by introducing a per file group for efficiency. However, the complexity of
these schemes [BKP09, HCM01, CHR09, TWZ09, YC10, LYRL10, TS11] is proportional to the system scale and the number of users. Recently, Yu et al. [YWRL10]
stretched out a scalable data access control scheme for cloud computing, which combined techniques of key-policy attribute-based encryption, proxy re-encryption and
lazy re-encryption. In their scheme, cloud servers were unable to learn the plaintext
during data re-encryption. However, the cloud servers must learn the whole user ID
list and attribute list in exchange.
Vimercati et al. [dVFJ+ 07b] proposed an encryption scheme for securing data
stoppage on untrusted servers. Their scheme was based on key derivation methods
[AFB05]. In their scheme, to grant access for a user, the owner created corresponding public tokens with his secret key. The user was able to derive decryption keys
for desired files. Then the owner transmitted these public tokens to the semi-trusted
server and delegates the task of token distribution to it. Given these public tokens,
the server was not able to derive the decryption key of any file. This solution introduced a minimal number of secret key per user and a minimal number of encryption
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key per each file. However, the complexity of operations of file creation and user
grant/revocation is linear to the number of users. Goh et al. [GSMB03] proposed
SiRiUS which was layered over existing file systems such as NFS, but provided endto-end security. For the purpose of access control, SiRiUS attached each file with a
meta data file that contained the file’s access control list (ACL), each entry of which
was the encryption of the file’s file encryption key (FEK) using the public key of an
authorized user. The extended version of SiRiUS used NNL broadcast encryption
algorithm [NNL01b] to encrypt the FEK of each file. As the complexity of the user
revocation solution in NNL is proportional to the number of revoked users, SiRiUS
has the same complexity in terms of each meta data file’s size and the encryption
overhead, and thus is not flexible. Ateniese et al. [AFGH05] proposed a secure distributed storage scheme based on proxy re-encryption. Specifically, the data owner
encrypted blocks of content with a master public key, which could only be decrypted
by the master private key. The data owner then generated proxy re-encryption keys
by using his master private key and the user’s public key. With these proxy reencryption keys, the semi-trusted proxies could convert the ciphertext into another
ciphertext for a specific granted user. The main problem with this scheme is that
user access privilege is not protected from the proxy.
Nowadays, ABE has been seen as an ideal technique for achieving flexible, scalable and fine-grained access control mechanisms in the cloud. Wang et al. [WLW10]
proposed a hierarchical attribute-based encryption scheme to achieve fine-grained
access control in cloud storage services by combining hierarchical identity-based
encryption and ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE). In their
scheme, they assumed that all attributes in one conjunctive clause were administered by the same domain master, however it is difficult to implement in practice so
that the same attribute can be administered by multiple domain masters according
to specific policies. Another difficulty is that their scheme can not support compound attributes efficiently and does not support multiple value assignments. Yu et
al. [YWRL10] stretched out a scalable data access control scheme for cloud computing which combined techniques of key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE),
proxy re-encryption and lazy re-encryption, where cloud servers were unable to learn
the plaintext during data re-encryption, however the encryptor in their scheme is
not able to decide who can decrypt the encrypted data, and has no choice but to
trust the key issuer. In addition, the cloud servers must learn the whole user ID list
and attribute list in exchange.

4.1. Introduction

43

Considering the user privacy and data security in a cloud environment, in this
chapter, an encryption system is proposed to achieve flexible and fine-grained access
control on outsourced data. In particular, the problem of defining and assigning
keys to users is concerned. The access policies and users’ information are hidden
to the third-party cloud servers. The proposed scheme is partially based on the
observation that, in practical application scenarios, each user can be associated with
a set of attributes, which are meaningful in the access policy and data file context.
The access policy can thus be defined as a logical expression formula over different
attribute sets to reflect the scope of data file that the kind of user is allowed to
access. As any access policy can be represented as such a logical expression formula,
fine-grained access control can be achieved. In this system, a policy hidden attributeset based encryption and server re-encryption mechanism (SRM) are proposed to
achieve as follows: 1) The cloud server can re-encrypt data files by given encryption
keys from data owner, without learning the contents or requiring any information
about the users from data owner, 2) data file creation/deletion does not require
a system-wide data file update or re-keying, and 3) new user creation and user
revocation do not affect other users and do not require other users to re-key their
private key.
The contribution of this chapter can be summarized as threefold: 1) A two-tier
encryption model is proposed to achieve flexible and fine-grained access control for
outsourced data in clouds, 2) private data content and information about the users
as well as the access policies are not leaked to the cloud provider, and 3) the proposed
scheme is provable secure under the standard model.
Organization of This Chapter. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
In Section 4.2, the design goals and main idea are introduced. The encryption model
is also proposed. In Section 4.3, the base model is presented. In Section 4.4, the
surface model is then described. The security proof and analysis of the proposed
scheme are given in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes this chapter.
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Design Goal and Main Idea
Design Goal

The main design goal is to help the data owner achieve a flexible and fine-grained
access control on the outsourced data in clouds. The aim is to prevent the cloud
provider from learning the data contents and user information, and allow the data
owner to define users who can get access to data files. Specifically, user’s creation or
revocation should not affect other users, namely other users do not need to update
their secret keys. In addition, the proposed scheme also features policy-hiding and
is secure against to the collusion attacks from malicious users.

4.2.2

Main Idea

Considering to achieve a flexible and fine-grained access control on the outsourced
data in cloud environment, a functional encryption system which is named as encryption is proposed. This system proposes attribute-set-based encryption as a base
tier and server re-encryption mechanism as a surface tier.
As any access structure can be represented as an access tree T , each data file is
associated with an access structure from where different attribute sets can be generated. Take the example in Figure 4.1, which gives an instance of access structure and
attribute sets that can be generated. It describes a data file that can be accessed by
CS staff, CS students from class one, or CS students from class two. Specifically, the
privileged users hold an attribute set as one of the following: (University, CS, Student, Class.1), (University, CS, Student, Class.2), or (University, CS, Staff). These
attribute sets are used to generate the private keys of the privileged users. Each
attribute in the attribute sets is given a chosen value Si . A student in class one who
holds an attribute set (University, CS, Student, Class.1) can decrypt this data file
using his private key computed as h(Suni + Scs + Sstudent + Sclass.1 ). Analogically, a
professor in CS department decrypts the data file by using his secret key computed
as h(Suni + Scs + Sstaf f ). The construction of attribute-set based encryption allows
different users to decrypt the data file with the corresponding secret keys, which
does not encrypt access structure into a ciphertext.
However, this access control cannot be considered as flexible when the attributeset based scheme runs alone. One challenging issue here, caused by user revocation,
is to require a system-wide private keys update against the expedience of users.
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Figure 4.1: An example for the proposed scenario.
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Thus, a server re-encryption mechanism is proposed. This mechanism combines
with the attribute-set based scheme, to eliminate users from updating their private
keys when a user joins or leaves. In addition, in scenarios involving potentially
huge sets of data files of considerable size, re-encryption and re-transmission by
data owner may not be acceptable. As the cloud servers are assumed to be more
powerful, the task of data file re-encryption is done by the cloud server without
disclosing file content and attribute list.

4.2.3

The Encryption System

It is assumed that the two-tier encryption system consists of the following three
parties: the Data Owner who is also the cloud user, the Cloud Provider who provides
cloud servers, and many data consumers that can be referred as users for brevity.
The data owner encrypts the data files first before sends them into the cloud and
builds a server re-encryption mechanism (SRM) that works as a second level dynamic
password generator. Now each tier model of this system is introduced in details, as
base model and surface model respectively.
• Base Phase: The data owner at local, before outsourcing data into the clouds,
performs a attribute-set based encryption on the data files according to the
access policies.
• Surface Phase: The cloud server performs the dynamic encryption operations over the encrypted data files, when receiving request messages from the
data owner.
To access the data files stored in cloud, users download the ones of their interest
from the cloud provider and decrypt them with their own decryption key. The data
owner is not required to be always online unless there are necessary changes in the
access structure that caused by the the user grant or revocation. As the servers in
cloud are assumed to have abundant storage capacity and computation power, the
task of data file re-encryption is transferred to the cloud servers without the leakage
of data file contents and any information about the users, including the number of
users and users’ ID list. The server re-encryption mechanism, which run on the
cloud servers, handles the data file re-encrypt task in a imperceptible way without
requiring the users to re-key their decryption keys for re-encrypted data files.
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Figure 4.2: Generate an access matrix.

4.3
4.3.1

Base Phase
Access Structure and Attribute Sets

Consistently with the data outsourcing scenario, it is assumed that there exists
several attribute sets in the system and the data owner therefore defines access
structures for users to access the outsourced data. These access structures are
abstracted in a down-top manner to generate authorizations that can be modeled
via an access matrix. Each row of the access matrix is set to one privilege attribute
set for a specific user or users, with a generated secret key for corresponding data
file.
Definition 4.1 (Access Structure)
Any access structure can be represented as an access tree T, where each interior
node x in the tree is a threshold gate with threshold value kx and numx children,
0 < kx ≤ numx . These threshold gates can capture the cases of AND and OR,
as kx = 1 for “OR” and kx = numx for “AND”. Each leaf node x of the tree is
described by an attribute and a threshold value kx = 1.
A few functions for T are first defined. The function attr(x) and node(i) = x is
defined if and only if x is a leaf node. parent(x) returns the parent of a node x while
attr(x) = i and node(i) = x are used to associate the node x with attribute i. T
also defines an ordering for the children of every node, from 1 to num. The function
index(x) returns the ordering number associated with the node x. The index values
are uniquely assigned to nodes in T in an arbitrary manner.
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Definition 4.2 (Attribute Sets) Let A be the set of leaf nodes in the access structure
T, which contains n different attributes denoted as a1 , a2 , a3 , ..., an . Define a function
(
1 when set Ã satisfies the access structure T,
F (Ã, T) =
0 otherwise
Then Ã is an authorized attribute set if and only if Ã ⊆ A and F (Ã, T) = 1. AS
denotes the set of authorized attribute sets, that is, AS = {Ã|F (Ã, T) = 1}. Let
m = |AS|, then AS = {Ã1 , Ã2 , ..., Ãm } where Ãi ⊆ AS for i = 1, 2, ..., m.
The set of attribute sets AS can be presented by an n × m matrix, with n and
m defined above. The i-th row of M atrix(A) is a vector (bi,1 , . . . , bi,n ) in {0, 1}n
representing the authorized attribute set Ãi . bi,j = 1 if the attribute aj is presented
in Ãj and 0 otherwise. The M atrix(A) then records the set of authorized attribute
sets AS = {Ã|F (Ã, T ) = 1} that corresponds to different users. As an example,
the attribute matrix shown in Figure 4.2 illustrates the attribute sets in Figure 4.1
correctly, and enforces the access structure represented by the access tree.
Given an attribute matrix M atirx(A), secret keys to different users can be defined and assigned. It is assumed that each user is associated with a single key
generated from the components of an attribute set, while communicated to him by
the owner on a secure transmission channel. Given the values of the components in
attribute set Ãi (1 ≤ i ≤ m), a secret key SKj is defined as,
X
si ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
SKj = h(
ai ∈Ãj

where h is a deterministic cryptographic function, for example a secure one-way
hash function, and si denotes the random values assigned to the attributes ai . After
m keys are generated from attribute sets Ã1 , Ã2 , ..., Ãm , the key assignment function
then associates with each user holding attribute set Ãi and the secret key SKi .
Definition 4.3 (Key Assignment) Key assignment is a function G that releases
SKi to each user u ∈ U who holds the attribute set Ãi .

4.3.2

Definition of Attribute-set Based Encryption

The formal definition of the proposed attribute-set based encryption is given in
this section. An attribute-set based encryption scheme consists of four probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Encryption and Decryption.
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Setup(λ, T, A) → (SK1 , SK2 , ..., SKm , M atrix(A)). The setup algorithm takes as
input the security parameter λ, the access structure T and the attribute universe
description A and outputs m different secret keys for numxroot attribute sets and an
attribute matrix M atrix(A).
KeyGen(SK1 , SK2 , ..., SKm ) → P K. The key generation algorithm takes as input
the different secret keys (SK1 , SK2 , ..., SKm ) and outputs an encryption key P K.
Encryption(P K, M ) → CT . The encryption algorithm takes as input the encryption parameters P K, the message M , and an access formula A over the universe
attributes and outputs a ciphertext CT such that only users whose private keys
satisfy the access formula should be able to extract M .
Decrypt(CT, SKj ) → M . The decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT ,
and one of the private keys SKj where 1 ≤ j ≤ m and outputs the plaintext M .

4.3.3

Main Construction

The main construction of the base phase is performed by the data owner, before outsourcing the data item into the cloud. It enforces policy hidden attribute-set based
encryption on the data files according to the access policies. Here the polynomial
function which is introduced in [MVN99] has been borrowed.
Setup(T, A) → (SK1 , SK2 , ..., SKm , M atrix(A)). In the basic construction, it chooses
two large prime numbers p and q such that q|p − 1, and chooses a generator
element g ∈ Z∗p of order q.

For each attribute ai ∈ A, it chooses a random

value si ∈ Zp . With the access structure T, xroot may have numxroot values the
different attribute sets, that is, m secret keys associated with attribute sets Ã1
to Ãm .

By generating the M atrix(A), these secret keys can be computed as
P
SKj = h( ai ⊆Ãi si ai ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
KeyGen(SK1 , SK2 , ..., SKm ) → P K. On input the secret keys, the key generation
algorithm constructs a polynomial function as
f (x) =

m
m
Y
X
(x − SKj ) ≡
aj x j
j=1

mod q,

j=0

where aj ’s are coefficients. It generates the encryption key P K = (g a0 , g a1 , ..., g am ).
Encryption(P K, M ) → CT . The encryption algorithm then chooses random r ∈ Zq
and generators h ∈ Z∗p , and outputs a ciphertext (c1 , c2 ):
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(
CT =

r
c1 ← (hr · g0r , g1r , ..., gm
)

c2 = M · hr

Decrypt(CT, SKj ) → M . For each decryption key SKj , the decryption algorithm
computes
(

SKj r

hr ← hr · g0r · g1

SKj m r

· ... · gm

M = c2 /hr
Thus M can be computed.

4.4

Surface Phase

The surface phase is initialized by the data owner and performed by the cloud servers
over the outsourced data files. It enforces the dynamic encryption operations over
the encrypted data files, when receiving request messages from the data owner. The
request messages contain new encryption keys for cloud servers as input. Combining
with the base phase, the surface phase allows the server to conduct re-encryption
for the users.

4.4.1

Server re-encryption Mechanism

The proposed server re-encryption mechanism (SRM) is a mechanism that runs by
the cloud server, especially for new user creation or user revocation. This mechanism
proceeds in rounds as a state transition diagram, shown as Figure 4.3. During each
round, the server listens to the request from the data owner with an encrypted
data file index CTi corresponding to a new public key P K ∗ , and then performs
re-encryption on CTi with P K ∗ and associate the re-encrypted ciphertext CT ∗ with
index i. Finally SRM updates the re-encrypted data CT ∗ to replace the previous
CT and record this replacement in the system.
The main difference between the proposed server re-encryption mechanism and
proxy re-encryption is as follows. In proxy re-encryption, it allows a proxy to transform a ciphertext computed under data owner’s public-key into one that can be
opened by user’s secret key. In this case, the data owner could designate a proxy to
re-encrypt her file into a format that the user can decrypt using his own secret key.
The re-encryption key is generated by the user (decryptor) or generated by using the
decryptor’s public key. However in the proposed server re-encryption mechanism,
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Enabled
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Record
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Associate

Re-encrypt
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Figure 4.3: The state transition diagram of SRM.
the re-encryption key is assumed to be generated only by the data owner (encryptor)
and no additional information is required.
Under the construction of SRM, the data owner only needs to generate server reencryption keys and does not need to re-send a novel encrypted version of the data
files. As for example, if the data file has a size of 10GByte and the request to the
cloud server requires a 1MByte data packet, in terms of network traffic, compared
to the transmission of the re-encrypted data file, the improvement is in the order of
107 .

4.4.2

Main Construction of SRM

The main construction of SRM is composed of three algorithms: Setup, Re-encrypt,
and Decrypt. Noted that the Decrypt algorithm is not run on SRM, but be operated
on the user’s side. This algorithm is presented as part of the main construction only
for completeness.
Setup(λ, CTi ) → I. The setup algorithm takes in the security parameters λ and
every index CTi of the outsourced data, generates an index list I as output.
∗ v
Re-encrypt(CT, P K ∗ ) → CT ∗ . On receiving P K ∗ as ((hv ·(g0∗ )v , (g1∗ )v , ..., (gm
) ), e),

where e = h−r · hv , output the re-encrypted ciphertext as (c∗1 , c∗2 ):
(
∗ v
c∗1 ← (hv · (g0∗ )v , (g1∗ )v , ..., (gm
) )
CT =
∗
r
−r
v
c2 = c2 · e = M · h · h · h = M · hv
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Decrypt(CT ∗ , SKj ) → M . For each SKj , the decryption algorithm computes M as
in the base phase.

4.5
4.5.1

Proof and Analysis
Security Notations

The informal definitions of the various security properties are first presented. A
construction of encryption system must possess these security properties.
Confidentiality. Entities (including the cloud server) other than the intended
recipients specified by the access structure should not be able to learn anything
about the underlying plaintext message, even if users who are not intended recipients
collude.
Access-privacy. The cloud server or any recipient should not be able to gain any
knowledge of the access structure except that the recipient knows whether he satisfies
the access policy. Also, colluded users (who do not meet the access structure) should
be unable to gain any knowledge about the access policy.
Definition 4.4 (Security) A construction of the encryption system is secure if it
holds confidentiality and access-privacy.

4.5.2

Security Model

Formally speaking, the confidentiality of an encryption system is defined as follows.
Definition 4.5 (C-IND-CPA-RCA) An encryption system has Ciphertext Indistinguishability against Chosen Plaintext Attack and Restricted Collusion Attack (CIND-CPA-RCA) if no PPT adversary A can win the following games against the
Challenger C with probability non-negligibly greater than 1/2. Meanwhile, none of the
collusion of corrupted users collectively satisfies the target access structure throughout the games.
Below a game-base approach is used to define the security formally. The adversary A models a malicious user or a cloud server which is Byzantine, i.e., can
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behave arbitrarily, however, cannot collude with users that satisfies the target access structure. In the formalized game, the adversaries are trying to break the
C-IND-CPA-RCA security.
Let C be the game simulator. Then the game 1 runs as follows:
Setup Phase C sets up the encryption system and makes all public parameters
such as the attributes in the system available to A.
Probing Phase 1 The adversary A has the ability to arbitrarily: a) register a new
user into the system, and decide the set of attributes possessed by the user being
registered. For simplicity, it is assumed that a user immediately acquires all the
credentials for his attributes upon registration, b) issue queries for attribute sets Ãi
for many access structure Tj where Ãi ⊆ Tj for all j, c) issue retrieval requests to
the owner for encryption keys, and d) corrupt an honest user, thereby learning his
secrets and acting on behalf of him.
Challenge Phase The adversary A submits two messages (M0 , M1 ) of equal length
and a challenge access structure T of his choice under the restriction that, none of
the collusion of corrupted users collectively satisfies the challenge access structure
throughout the games. Then the Challenger C flips a fair coin b ∈R {0, 1}, generates
γ with Ãi and encrypts message Mb with γ. The ciphertext is then passed to A.
Probing Phase 2 Probing phase 1 is repeated.
Guess Phase Eventually A outputs a guess b∗ of b. A wins if and only if b∗ = b.
The advantage of an adversary A in this game is defined as Pr[b∗ = b] − 1/2.
Now the access-privacy of an encryption system is defined and formalized by
using game 2.
Definition 4.6 (AP-IND-CPA-RCA) An encryption system has Access Privacy Indistinguishability against Chosen Plaintext Attack and Restricted Collusion Attack
(AP-IND-CPA-RCA) if no PPT adversary A can win the following games against
the Challenger C with probability non-negligibly greater than 1/2. Meanwhile, all
corrupted users satisfy none of the target access structures throughout the game and
the target access structures have same number of satisfying attribute sets.
Let C and A denote the Challenger and Adversary respectively, then game 2
runs as follows:
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Setup Phase C sets up the encryption system and makes all public parameters
such as the attributes in the system available to A.
Probing Phase 1 The adversary A has the ability to arbitrarily: a) register a new
honest user into the system, and decide the set of attributes possessed by the user
being registered. For simplicity, it is assumed that a user immediately acquires all
the credentials for his attributes upon registration, b) make deposit and retrieval
requests to the owner or cloud server, and c) corrupt an honest user, thereby learning
his secrets and acting on behalf of him.
Challenge Phase The adversary A sends to C a message M ∗ and two valid access
structures T1 and T2 of his choice under the restriction same in the above definition.
Then the Challenger C flips a fair coin b ∈R {0, 1} and encrypts message M under
access structure Tb . The resulting ciphertext C ∗ is then passed to A.
Probing Phase 2 A may do whatever he is allowed to in Probing phase 1.
Guess Phase Eventually A outputs a guess b∗ of b. A wins if and only if b∗ = b.
The advantage of an adversary A in this game is defined as Pr[b∗ = b] − 1/2.

4.5.3

Proof Of Security

The security of encryption is reduced to the hardness of the DDH assumption.
Theorem 4.1 If the DDH assumption holds for Z∗p , then the encryption system
has Ciphertext Indistinguishability against Chosen Plaintext Attack and Restricted
Collusion Attack (C-IND-CPA-RCA).
Proof:

Suppose there exists a polynomial-time adversary A that can attack the

proposed scheme in the standard model with advantage . A simulator B which can
play the DDH game with advantage /2 is built. The simulator B is given a DDH
problem instance (g, g α , g β , R) from the DDH challenger generated in the following
process. The challenger flips a fair binary coin µ, outside of B’s view. It sets the
problem instance as (g, g α , g β , R) where R = g αβ if µ = 0 or R is a random group
element if µ = 1. The goal of B is to output the big µ.
Setup The simulator B chooses public parameters G and g, and sets h = g k for
some random value k.
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Probing 1 The adversary A adaptively makes requests for registering new users into
the system with chosen attribute set Ãi for many access structure Tj . B generates
the encryption key and the decryption key according to the protocol.
Challenge The adversary A will submit two challenge messages M0 and M1 to
the simulator and a challenge access structure T. Define the polynomial f (x) =
Qm
j=1 (x − SKj ) such that the SKj ’s are the user secret key satisfying the access
structure T. Without loss of generality, let SK0 = α and suppose the rest of the
Q
Pm
j
SKj ’s are just random numbers. Rewrite f (x) = m
j=1 (x − SKj ) ≡
j=0 aj x
mod q. The simulator can express each coefficient aj as aj = uj · α + vj for some
known uj , vj for j = 0 to m. B sets the encryption key as (g aj = (g α )uj g vj )m
j=0 .
The simulation is perfect because due to the restriction of the game, A has no
information about the SKj ’s.
The simulator flips a fair binary coin b, and returns an encryption of Mb as
follows:
(
CT =

c1 ← (g β )k · Ru0 · (g β )v0 , Ru1 · (g β )v1 , ..., Rum · (g β )vm
c2 = Mb · (g β )k

If µ = 0, R = g αβ . Then by inspection, the ciphertext is a valid ciphertext for
message Mb , with the randomness r = β.
If µ = 1, then R is just a random group element. Thus the ciphertext will be
a random element of G from the adversary’s viewpoint and the ciphertext contains
no information about Mb .
Probing 2 The simulator acts exactly as it did in phase 1.
Guess A will submit b∗ of b. If b∗ = b, the simulator will output µ∗ = 0 to indicate
that it was given a valid DDH triple; otherwise, it will output µ∗ = 1 to indicate it
was given a random element triple.
In the case where µ = 1, the adversary gains no information about b. Therefore,
it has Pr[b∗ = b|µ = 1] =
it has Pr[µ∗ = µ|µ = 1] =

1
.
2
1
.
2

Since the simulator guesses µ∗ = 1 when b∗ 6= b,
If µ = 0 then the adversary sees an encryption of

Mb . The adversary’s advantage in this situation is  by assumption. Therefore,
Pr[b∗ = b|µ = 0] =
Pr[µ∗ = µ|µ = 0] =

1
+ . Since the simulator guesses
2
1
+ . The overall advantage of the
2

µ∗ = 0 when b∗ = b, it has
simulator in the DDH game

is:
1
1
1
1 1
1 1 1
1
Pr[µ∗ = µ|µ = 0] + Pr[µ∗ = µ|µ = 1] − = · ( + ) + · − = .
2
2
2
2 2
2 2 2
2
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Theorem 4.2 If the DDH assumption holds for Z∗p , then the encryption system has
Access Privacy Indistinguishability against Chosen Ciphertext Attack and Restricted
Collusion Attacks (AP-IND-CPA-RCA).
Proof:

Suppose there exists a polynomial-time adversary A that can attack the

proposed scheme in the standard model with advantage . A simulator B which can
play the DDH game with advantage /2 is built.
Again, B is given a DDH problem instance (g, g α , g β , R) and its goal is to determine if R = g αβ indicating µ = 0 or R is just a random group element indicating
µ = 1.
Setup The simulator B chooses public parameters G and g, and sets h = g k for
some random value k.
Probing 1 The adversary A adaptively makes requests for several access structures
Tj . B generates the encryption key and the decryption key according to the protocol.
Challenge The adversary A will submit a challenge message M and two challenge
access structures T0 , T1 to the simulator. SKj,b for j = 0 to m and b ∈ {0, 1} is
used to denote the set of secret keys for access structure Tb . Since the two access
structures are different, there exists at least one secret key that is not common to
both access structure. Without loss of generality, let SK0,0 be that secret key. The
simulator B sets SK0,0 = α and randomly picks values for all other SKj,b ’s. The
encryption key of T0 is then (g a0,0 , . . . , g am,0 ) such that each aj,0 is of the form uj α+vj
for j = 0 to m. Thus, g aj,0 can be computed by B as (g α )uj g vj . The encryption key
of T1 is (g a0,1 , . . . , g am,1 ) such that each aj,1 is known to the simulator.
It encrypts M under T0 as follows.
(
c1 ← (g β )k · Ru0 · (g β )v0 , Ru1 · (g β )v1 , ..., Rum · (g β )vm
CT =
c2 = M · (g β )k
If µ = 0, R = g αβ . Then by inspection, the ciphertext is a valid ciphertext for
message M under the access structure T0 . If µ = 1, then R is just a random element
and thus the ciphertext contains no information about Tb .
Probing 2 The simulator acts exactly as it did in phase 1.
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Guess A will submit b∗ . If b∗ = 0, the simulator will output µ∗ = 0 to indicate that
it was given a valid DDH triple; otherwise, it will output µ∗ = 1 to indicate it was
given a random element triple.
In the case where µ = 1, the adversary gains no information about Tb . Therefore,
it has Pr[b∗ = 0|µ = 1] = 21 . Since the simulator guesses µ∗ = 1 when b∗ 6= 0, it
has Pr[µ∗ = µ|µ = 1] = 21 . The adversary’s advantage in the case when µ = 0 is
 by definition. Therefore, Pr[b∗ = 0|µ = 0] =
µ∗ = 0 when b∗ = 0, it has Pr[µ∗ = µ|µ = 0] =

1
+ . Since the simulator guesses
2
1
+ . The overall advantage of the
2

simulator in the DDH game is:
1
1
1
1 1
1 1 1
1
Pr[µ∗ = µ|µ = 0] + Pr[µ∗ = µ|µ = 1] − = · ( + ) + · − = .
2
2
2
2 2
2 2 2
2

4.6

Conclusion

There is an emerging trend towards data resourcing where data management is
outsourced to clouds that provide storage capabilities and high-bandwidth distribution channels. In this chapter, an encryption scheme for a two-tier system is
proposed to achieve flexible and fine-grained access control in the cloud. Most of
the computation-intensive tasks are delegated to cloud servers without leaking private data. The security of the proposed scheme is proven in the standard model.

Chapter 5
Privacy-Enhanced Keyword Search in
Clouds
The advent of cloud computing has dramatically changed the IT scene, as it offers
cost savings and improvements to major operations. Nevertheless, the major obstacle relies on the effort on how to secure sensitive data files that are outsourced
to the cloud environment. To ensure confidentiality, the sensitive data are usually
encrypted prior to being outsourced. Nevertheless, effective data utilization remains
a challenging task and there is a clear need for a secure and efficient searching mechanism over the encrypted data in the cloud, to increase the usability of the secure
cloud environment. Unfortunately, existing works in the area of secure searching in
the outsourcing scenario usually incur high computational complexity, which makes
the approach impractical. In this chapter, an efficient keyword search scheme for
cloud computing is proposed. The proposed solution is very simple, and it enables
efficient multi-user keyword search over outsourced data files in the cloud environment, without leaking any private information about either the data owner or users
in the search query. The security requirements are formally defined and the security
of the proposed scheme is proven under a simple assumption in the standard model.

5.1

Introduction

Due to its low cost, robustness and flexibility, cloud computing changes the way entities manage their data and offers individuals and companies with affordable storage,
professional maintenance and adjustable space. Among the four cloud computing
deployed models that includes: public, private, community and hybrid, public cloud
where the outsourced resources can be accessed by the general public has gain a
dramatic growth. By using a public cloud, a variety of users could access or share
information that are stored in the cloud, independent of their different locations.
58
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Meanwhile, it also makes effective data utilization a challenging task as the outsourced data is usually in the encrypted form.
To set the scene, let us consider the following scenario. Let us consider a user
Alice who uses a public cloud to store her personal data files such as family photos, blogs and working documents. To prevent the cloud server from learning the
contents, she encrypts all her files prior to sending her data to the cloud. Once
a while, she would like to access her files from different devices, such as a Boxee
Box, an Apple TV or even her iPhone. Naturally, Alice would not remember all the
contents that she has stored in the cloud. Therefore, there is a need for efficient
searching over her outsourced files using the appropriate keywords. Since some of her
mobile devices are only equipped with limited computational power, the searching
mechanism should be very efficient, and it should ideally avoid using the relatively
expensive techniques in public key cryptography, such as bilinear pairings.
In other some cases, she would also like to share some of the files with her family
and friends. For example, data files with labels “family” and “friends” from Alice
would be accessible by her family member and friends, respectively. However, this
requires Alice to define whom her family and friends are and requires the cloud
server to enforce access control. This requirement may burden the regular users
with the required expensive operations, and it may also reveal some information
with regards to Alice’s social networks.
Thus it is necessary to look for a practical scheme which provides:
• an efficient data search, and
• a simple access control.
Overview of The Proposed Approach. It turns out that a simple and straightforward approach could fit Alice’s requirements. Before outsourcing each data file,
Alice attaches a “hidden index” h related to a certain keyword w to it. The hidden
index h is computed as H(w) for a hash function H using a keyword w. This can be
easily extended to the multi-keyword case where each file F is attached with several
hidden indexes for the relevant keywords. In order to search all files related to a
keyword w∗ , Alice computes h∗ = H(w∗ ) and sends h∗ to the cloud, who returns
all the data files attached with hidden index h∗ . This idea can be used for simple
access control as well. For instance, data files to be shared with Alice’s friends could
be attached be a hidden index with w as “friends”. Alice’s friends could then access
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those files using “friends” as the searching keyword. In this case a keyword plays
the role of a password.
Unfortunately, this approach is inadequate in terms of the keyword search as
well as a simple access control. Firstly, it leaks some information about the keyword
to the cloud since the cloud can guess the keywords by testing whether the hash
of it matches with the hidden index. Secondly, the keyword are human-memorable
and is thus suspectable to the guessing attack. This is thus unsuitable even for a
simple access control purpose.
One possible way to deal with these vulnerabilities is to generate a random value
ti for each possible keyword wi . Since ti is completely random, the scheme will not
be vulnerable to the guessing attack. However, the drawback is apparent. Alice is
required to build up a look up table which links every keyword to its corresponding
random number. Firstly, the table could be large if Alice would set the file name as
keyword (which is natural since this would allow her to search using the file name).
Secondly, Alice has to keep an up-to-date copy of the table in all her devices.
Finally, the above issue is tackled by the use of the pseudo-random function
(Prf). Instead of generating a random value ti for each possible keyword wi , Alice
computes ti as the output of the pseudo-random function with input wi and a secret
seed s. The value of s is kept secret and is stored in all Alice’s devices. Indeed, the
issue of storing the look up table has been reduced to just storing merely one secret
seed s.
The proposed system is called simple privacy-enhanced keyword search in clouds
(SPEKS) to emphasize its simplicity. The term privacy-enhanced is used to reflect
the privacy guarantee about the proposed scheme. The cloud server can still tell if
two data files share the same keyword. Exact security guarantee provided by the
proposed system will be formalized in subsequent sections.
Related Works. Existing works close to the proposed scheme can be found in the
areas of “searching with privacy” and “searching on private-key-encrypted data”.
In theory, the classical work of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [GO96] on oblivious RAMs
could resolve the problem of doing (private) searches on remote encrypted data,
where oblivious RAMs hided all information about the RAM use from a remote and
potentially malicious server with a poly-logarithmic overhead in all parameters (including computation and communication). Although their scheme is asymptotically
efficient and nearly optimal, it does not appear to be efficient in practice as large
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constants are hidden in the big-O notation.
In an effort to reduce the round complexity associated with oblivious RAMs,
Song et al. [SWP00] presented a solution for searchable encryption and after that
how to do keyword searches on encrypted data efficiently was raised. In [SWP00],
they achieved searchable encryption by constructing a special two-layered encryption
for each word. Given a trapdoor, the server could strip the outer layer and assertain
whether the inner layer was in the correct form. The limitations in this construction
are as follows. First, it is not compatible with existing file encryption schemes
and a specific encryption method must be used. Second, while the construction is
proven to be a secure encryption scheme, it is not proven to be a secure searchable
encryption scheme. Third, the distribution of the underlying plaintexts is vulnerable
to statistical attacks. Their approach may leak the locations of the keyword in a
file. Finally, searching is linear in the length of the document collection.
The above limitations are addressed by Goh [jG03], Chang and Mitzenmacher
[CM05] and also Curtmola, Garay, Kamara and Ostrovsky [CGKO06]. In [jG03],
they built an index of keywords for each file using a Bloom filter with pseudorandom functions. One inherent problem with this Bloom-filter-based approach is
that Bloom filters can induce false positives, which would potentially cause mobile
users to download extra files not containing the keyword. In [CM05], Chang and
Mitzenmacher achieved the notion of security to IND2-CKA for chosen keyword
attack, however their scheme cannot guarantee that the trapdoors do not leak any
information about the words being queried. In [CGKO06], they proposed a multiuser construction that was efficient on the server side. However, every node in the
link list has to be augmented with information about the file index of the next node.
In a different direction, Boneh, di Crescenzo, Ostvrosky and Persiano [BCOP04]
and Boneh, Kuchilevitz, Ostvrosky and Skeith [BKOI07] studied the problem of
how to search on data encrypted by a public-key cryptosystem. These schemes are
motivated by an encrypted email system. Their constructions, however, have an
overhead in search time that is proportional to the square root of the database size,
which is far less efficient than the best private-key solutions. Boneh et al.’s approach
[BCOP04] was known to be the seminal public key encryption scheme with keyword
search (PEKS). It was observed in [BSNS05] that Boneh et al.’s scheme [BCOP04]
required a secure channel, which made it impractical. Hence, Baek, Susilo and
Safavi-Naini [BSNS05] proposed the notion of secure-channel-free PEKS to improve
this drawback. This work had been further extended and revised in the recent
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literature, such as [RPSL09, RPSL10]. Byun et al. [BRPL06] suggested the notion
of a keyword-guessing attack and showed that the existing schemes were insecure
against this attack, given that the number of possible keywords was bounded by
some polynomial. They provided an open problem on how to construct a PEKS
with designated verifier that was secure against keyword-guessing attacks. This
question was answered affirmatively in [RPSL10]. In order to realize the practicality
of PEKS, the combination of a public key encryption scheme with PEKS to make a
single integrated entity had been studied in [BSNS06].
Organization of This Chapter. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In
the next section, the notion of SPEKS and its security requirements are formalized.
In Section 5.3, the construction and security analysis are given. In Section 5.4, the
performance of the proposed scheme is estimated. Section 5.5 concludes this chapter.

5.2

Model

In this section, the notion of SPEKS and its security requirements are formalized.

5.2.1

Syntax

SPEKS is a tuple of five algorithms, namely, ParamGen, KeyGen, IndexGen, TokenGen,
Test, whose definition is given below.
• ParamGen. On input a security parameter λ, this algorithm outputs a systemwide parameter param. param is assumed to be an implicit to all the algorithms below.
• KeyGen. This algorithm outputs a secret key s.
• IndexGen. On input a keyword w ∈ {0, 1}∗ , a secret key s, this algorithm
outputs a value h. The value h is called a hidden index.
• TokenGen. On input a keyword w ∈ {0, 1}∗ , a secret key s, this algorithm
outputs a value ω. The value ω is called a hidden token.
• Test. On input a hidden index h, a hidden token ω, this algorithm outputs 1
or 0.
As usual, correctness is of SPEKS is defined as follows.
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Definition 5.1 (Correctness) For any λ and any keyword w, Test(param, h, ω) =
1 if there exists ParamGen(λ) = param, s = KeyGen(param), h = IndexGen(param, s, w)
and ω = TokenGen(param, s, w).

5.2.2

Typical Use of SPEKS

Figure 5.1 briefly explain how a user Alice and the cloud server employ the algorithms in a typical scenario. Firstly, the cloud server invokes ParamGen to generate
the parameters1 . Alice invokes KeyGen to create her secret key s. Before outsourcing
her data file F to the cloud server, Alice would choose several suitable keywords,
say, w1 , ..., wn and invokes hF,i = IndexGen(s, wi ). She submits F along with hF,i to
the cloud. F is possibly the encryption of Alice’s data. How F is generated is out
of scope of this chapter.

ParamGen

Parameters

Alice

search files from the cloud
with keyword w’
 ' = TokenGen(s, w ')

TokenGen

KeyGen
Secret key s

Choose several suitable
keywords

Cloud Servers and Storage

hF,i = IndexGen(s,wi)
Submits file F
along with hF,i

Test

IndexGen

Returns all the files associated
with hidden index hF,I
such that Test(hF,i,  ' )=1

Figure 5.1: Typical use of SPEKS.
When Alice would like to search her files from the cloud with keyword w∗ , she
invokes ω ∗ = TokenGen(s, w∗ ) and submits ω ∗ to the cloud. The cloud returns all
the files associated with hidden index hF,i such that Test(hF,i , ω ∗ ) = 1. Alice could
share her files with keyword w∗ to others by giving them the value ω ∗ .
1

It is noted that Alice could generate the parameters, but in this case, the cloud server is
required to store a number of parameters since the cloud server needs to serve multiple users.
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A SPEKS System

In this section, the proposed SPEKS system is described. Essentially, the scheme
can be divided into two phases, namely Setup and Search. It should be highlighten
that the cloud user’s storage only consists of a small and constant value, in addition
to the keywords.
• Setup: The cloud server S runs the algorithm ParamGen to outputs a systemwide parameter param. The cloud user U runs the algorithm KeyGen to
generate the secret key s. U then runs the algorithm IndexGen and algorithm
TokenGen to generate the hidden index h and hidden token ω. Then U may
now delete the original data files from his/her local storage.
• Search: When the cloud user U requests to search for a hidden token ω:
1. S computes H(ω).
2. S runs the algorithm Test, checks whether there is a hidden index h equals
with H(ω), and sends U back the found data file.
When a friend F of U requests to search for a keyword wi :
1. F sends the keyword wi to U and U can return the hidden token ω.
2. F sends ω to S.
3. S computes H(ω), checks whether there is a h that matches with H(ω),
and returns the corresponding data file to F .

5.2.4

Security Requirements

Two security requirements are identified for SPEKS. The first one regards privacy.
Specifically, no one, not even the cloud server, should be able to obtain information
about the underlying keyword when given the hidden token and hidden index. The
second one concerns about the basic access control. No one should be able to
compute the hidden token when given the hidden index. These two requirements are
formalized by using security game played between a challenger C and an adversary
A.
Game Privacy.
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• Setup Challenger C invokes ParamGen(1λ ) = param, and KeyGen(param) =
s. Here param is given to the adversary A.
• Query Phase 1 A can issue two types of queries:
1. Index Query: A submits a keyword w and C replies with
IndexGen(param, s, w).
2. Token Query: A submits a keyword w and C replies with
TokenGen(param, s, w).
• Challenge Phase A submits two keywords w0 , w1 . C flips a fair coin b ∈
{0, 1} and computes hb = IndexGen(param, s, wb ). hb is returned to A as the
challenge.
• Query Phase 2 A can issue the same type of queries as in Query Phase 1
except it cannot submit queries with input w0 and w1 .
• Output A outputs a guess bit b0 . A wins the game if b = b0 .
The advantage of A in Game Privacy is defined as the probability that A wins minus
1/2.
Game Authenticity.
• Setup Challenger C invokes
ParamGen(1λ ) = param and KeyGen(param) = s.
param is given to the adversary A.
• Query Phase 1 A can issue two types of queries:
1. Index Query: A submits a keyword w and C replies with
IndexGen(param, s, w).
2. Token Query: A submits a keyword w and C replies with
TokenGen(param, s, w).
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• Challenge Phase A submits one keyword w0 . C computes h0 = IndexGen(param, s, w0 ).
h0 is returned to A as the challenge.
• Query Phase 2 A can issue the same type of queries as in Query Phase 1
except it cannot submit queries with input w0 .
• Output A outputs a value ω 0 . A wins the game if Test(param, h0 , ω 0 ) = 1.
The advantage of A in Game Authenticity is defined as the probability that A wins.
Definition 5.2 (Security) A construction of SPEKS is secure if no PPT adversary
A can win Game Privacy or Game Authenticity with non-negligible advantage.

5.3

The Construction and Security Analysis

5.3.1

Main Construction

• ParamGen. On input λ, output a one-way hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ .
• KeyGen. Randomly pick a pseudo-random function Prf : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}λ and a bitstring s ∈R {0, 1}λ and output s.
• IndexGen. On input w and s, output h = H(Prf(s, w)).
• TokenGen. On input w and s, output ω = Prf(s, w).
• Test. On input a hidden index h and a hidden token ω, output 1 if and only
if h = H(ω) and 0 otherwise.

5.3.2

Security Proof

Theorem 5.1 The construction of SPEKS is secure if the pseudo-random function
Prf employed is secure and the hash function H employed is one-way.
Proof: The proof is divided into two parts. In the first part, it is shown that if there
exists an adversary A that has non-negligible probability in wining Game Privacy, a
simulator S can be constructed to distinguish a pseudo-random function Prf from a
random function R. In the second part, it is shown that if there exists an adversary
A that has non-negligible probability in wining Game Authenticity, a simulator S
which breaks the one-way property of the hash function H can be constructed.
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Privacy.
• Setup S is given a function F and its goal is to distinguish if F is a random
function or not. Suppose with probability 1/2 S is given a truly random
function. S can query the function F adaptively. S chooses a one-way hash
function H and set H as param.
• Query Phase 1 S answers the queries as follows.
1. Index Query: A submits a keyword w and S replies with H(F (w)) by
querying F .
2. Token Query: A submits a keyword w and S replies with F (w) by querying F .
• Challenge Phase A submits two keywords w0 , w1 . S flips a fair coin b ∈
{0, 1} and computes hb = H(F (w)). hb is returned to A
• Query Phase 2 S answer A’s queries in the same way as in Query Phase 1.
• Output A outputs a guess bit b0 .
If A guesses correctly, S concludes F is not a random function. Otherwise, S concludes F is a random function. Suppose A wins with probability 1/2 + , probability
that S distinguishes correctly is 1/2 + /2. The reason is that if F is a random function, probability that A wins is exactly 1/2 since hb contains no information about
b. On the other hand, if F is not a random function, A can win with probability
1/2 + . Thus, S answers correctly with probability 1/2 + /2.

Authenticity. Here a simply game-hoping [Sho04, BP06] is used. In the first
game, denoted as Game Authenticity Real, the behavior of simulator S is described
below.
• Setup S chooses a pseudo-random function Prf with seed s and a hash
function H. H is given to A as param.
• Query Phase 1 S answers the queries as follows.
1. Index Query: A submits a keyword w and S replies with H(Prf(s, w)).
2. Token Query: A submits a keyword w and S replies with Prf(s, w).
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• Challenge Phase A submits one keywords w0 . S returns hb = H(Prf(s,
w0 )) to A.
• Query Phase 2 S answers A’s queries in the same way as in Query Phase 1.
• Output A outputs a guess bit b0 .
In the second game, denoted as Game Authenticity Modified, the simulator S’s
behavior is defined as follows.
• Setup S is given a hash function H, a value y and its goal is to compute a
value x such that y = H(x). S gives A H as param.
• Query Phase 1 For every keyword w submitted by A, S chooses a random
value rw and maintains a list of tuples (w, rw ). S then answers the queries as
follows.
1. Index Query: A submits a keyword w and S replies with H(rw )
2. Token Query: A submits a keyword w and S replies with rw
• Challenge Phase A submits one keyword w0 . S returns y to A.
• Query Phase 2 S answers A’s queries in the same way as in Query Phase 1.
• Output A outputs a value ω 0 .
A wins if and only if H(ω 0 ) = y. Thus, S outputs x = ω 0 as the pre-image of
y. It remains to argue the advantage of A in Game Authenticity Real and Game
Authenticity Modified are the same. A simple argument will do. If the advantage
of A in both games are difference, it is straight-forward to use A to distinguishes
Prf from a truly random function.

5.4

Performance

Efficiency. It is straightforward to see the construction of SPEKS is very efficient. Generation of a hidden index requires evaluation of one hash function and
one pseudo-random function. Generation of a hidden token requires evaluation of
one pesudo-random function. Testing if a hidden token matches with a hidden index
requires evaluation of one hash function. The overall cost during n protocol execun
n
n
tions is 2Thash
+ Tprf
, where Thash
is the time cost of hashing n values into the group
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n
G and Tprf
is the time cost of n pseudo-random functions. The time complexity in

the proposed scheme is O(n). Since both hash function and pseudorandom function
can be implemented efficiently by heuristic algorithms, all operations of SPEKS
can be conducted efficiently. Indeed, they are computable even by low power handheld devices. As for the storage, the data owner is required to store a single secret
seed s in the client side. In addition, while O(n · log n) external memory is required
in [GO96], SPEKS requires no external memory cost for storing the remote n data
files in the server side.

5.5

Conclusion

In this chapter, an efficient SPEKS was constructed. It was shown that SPEKS
was suitable for keyword search in the cloud environment. Comparing with the
existing keyword search schemes such as [LYCL11, WCRL12, ÖS12], the proposed
construction is much more efficient on both sides of the data owner and the cloud
server. In addition, the security of the proposed scheme has been proved in the
standard model.

Chapter 6
Public Remote Integrity Check for
Private Data
With Remote Integrity Check (RIC), the integrity of remotely stored data can be
(publicly) verified without the need of retrieving the original data. Hao, Zhong and
Yue [HZY11] (vol. 23, no. 9, IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng.) proposed a privacy preserving scheme for RIC. Their scheme preserved private information during
public verification; however, they require the verifier to be in possession of all the
homomorphic tags, which are the outputs of a one-way homomorphic function on
input the data, to the public. This requirement increases both the storage and communication cost. In addition, these tags might leak some information of the original
data, although they proved that the verifier cannot obtain any information about the
stored data during an execution. To overcome these problems, a privacy-preserving
RIC protocol is proposed in this chapter. The proposed protocol achieves public
verifiability without disclosing any information. It is ensured that no information
about the original data will be leaked. In fact, the verifier is only required to know
the public key of the data owner. The experimental results indicate that the proposed scheme is efficient especially when the data size is large or the integrity check
is frequent. The full proofs of security is also given under the random oracle model.

6.1

Introduction

Data integrity is essential for cloud applications. Remotely verifying data in the
cloud is referred to as the remote integrity check (RIC), where a verifier verifies
the target cloud dataset without the need of retrieving the dataset. This scenario
can be extended to achieve public verifiability. With a public RIC, anyone can be
the verifier. This raises a concern on data security, since the information of the
stored data should not be revealed to the public. Most of previous public RIC
70
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schemes [SW08, ABC+ 07, ABC+ 11] do not provide security so that a public verifier
can learn the information of private data during an integrity check, since the cloud
server might leak the data information. It is noticed that Hao, Zhong and Yue’s
public RIC scheme [HZY11] provides a security feature against data leakage. They
adopted the approach introduced by Sebe et al. [SFB+ 08] to support data dynamics
and privacy. However, their scheme requires the verifier to be in possession of all
the homomorphic tags used for the integrity check; therefore, it increases costs
for storage and communication. In addition, although they have proved that the
public verifier cannot learn the target dataset, the tags themselves could leak some
information about the dataset.
In this chapter, an innovative public RIC scheme without disclosing any information of stored data in cloud storage is proposed. The proposed scheme ensures
no information leakage of both the verified data and the homomorphic tags. The
authenticator proposed by Shacham and Waters [SW08] is adopted to achieve public
verifiability and protection of the data privacy. The proposed scheme also eliminates
the knowledge requirement of integrity tags for verification.
Comparison.
A comparison between the proposed RIC scheme and some selected existing
schemes is made in Table 6.1. The comparison is mainly based on the following
requirements and properties:
• Public verifiability. Because data integrity check is a frequent task, a client
may want to outsource this task to another party. With public verifiability,
anyone can be a verifier.
• Privacy-preserving. During the remote integrity check, a public verifier should
not obtain access to the client’s data files. However, the homomorphic tags
may disclose some information about the client’s data files.
• Without Data Disclosing. This property is defined as the extension of privacypreserving requirement. The third party verifier should not require any data
information during the protocol execution. Additionally, the homomorphic
tags should not disclose any data information to the public verifier.
• Sampling. As access the entire data file can be expensive in I/O costs, a
flexible RIC should allow the server to access only small portions of the file

[ABC+ 07],[ABC+ 11] [SW08] [WWL+ 09]
Public verifiability
X
X
×
Privacy-preserving
×
×
×
Without disclosing data
×
×
×
Sampling
X
X
X
Format independence
X
X
X
Size of tags
O(n · l)
O(n · l)
O(n · l)
Storage
O(l)
O(l)
O(l)
(1)
Communication
O(c · l)
O(c · l) O(c ·l · log n)
(2)
Communication
O(l)
O(l)
O(l)

[WWRL10],[WCW+ 09] [HZY11] Proposed Scheme
X
X
X
X
X
X
×
×
X
X
×
X
X
X
X
O(n · l)
O(n · l)
O(n · l)
O(l)
O(nl)
O(l)
O(c · l)
O(l)
O(c · l)
O(l)
O(n · l)
O(l)

Table 6.1: Comparisons between some previous protocols and the proposed scheme. Here n is the total block number, c is the
sampling block number, l is the length of each block. Communication(1) and Communication(2) indicate the communication
cost on verifier side and client side respectively. To achieve 80-bit security, the schemes [ABC+ 07, ABC+ 11, HZY11] use RSA
cryptography where l = 1024 bit, while the schemes [SW08, WWL+ 09, WWRL10] and the proposed scheme use elliptic curve
cryptography with |p| = 160bit where the block length l = 160 bit.
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during the verification. This property can be also referred as ‘sub-file access’
or ‘sub-linear authentication’.
• Format independence. Data format independence is a relevant feature in practical deployments. Encryption is an orthogonal issue and the outsourced data
file may consist of encrypted data chunks.
• Storage cost and Size of tags. An efficient RIC protocol should have a minimal
storage overhead to minimize costs, on both cloud server and verifier side. To
reduce the storage cost, the size of tags should be small.
• Communication cost. Transmitting large amounts of data across the network
can consume heavy bandwidths. An efficient RIC protocol should also introduce low communication cost for protocol execution.
Main Contributions. The main contributions of this chapter can be summarized
as follows: 1) A remote integrity check protocol is proposed for outsourced data
in cloud computing, which achieves public verifiability without disclosing any data
information. Compared with the protocol proposed by Hao et al. [HZY11], the
proposed scheme solves the issue that the verifier must be in possession of the tags
that would leak information about the verified data. 2) Full proofs of security against
arbitrary adversaries is given in the random oracle model. 3) The experimental
results have shown that the proposed scheme is efficient especially when the size of
the data file is large or the integrity check is frequent.
Related Work. Designing secure and efficient data verification protocols has attracted a lot of attention [OLR12]: works have varied from designing secure local
memory and secure storage at remote servers to securing cloud storage applications.
The needs in each field being specific, result in diverse kinds of such protocols.
Early verification schemes [BEG+ 94, BGG95, NR05] concentrated on the problem of data integrity on a local untrusted memory, i.e., memory checking. The challenging problem of data integrity verification without explicit knowledge of the full
file was first proposed in broad generality by Blum et al. [BEG+ 94], who explored
the task of checking the correctness of a memory-management program efficiently.
Naor and Rothblum [NR05] explored the problem of dynamic memory-checking in
a range of settings. Clarke et al. [CSG+ 05] focused on a trusted party which stored
a small amount of state information, verifying the integrity of arbitrary blocks of
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external memory. These early verification schemes are the first to suggest checking data integrity, however they are not applicable for remote data integrity checks
because they require the data to be transmitted in its entirety to the verifier.
The latest verification schemes concentrated on the problems of securing data
integrity at remote servers and securing clouds storage applications. These schemes
can be classified into ‘Proof of retrievability’ (POR) schemes (e.g., [JJ07, BJO09,
DVW09, SW08]) and ‘Provable data possession’ (PDP) schemes (e.g., [ABC+ 07,
ABC+ 11, EKPT09]). A POR scheme is a challenge-response protocol. In POR
schemes, a cloud provider demonstrates the file retrievability (i.e., recoverability
without any loss or corruption) to a client. PDP schemes are similar protocols
which only detect a large amount of corruption in outsourced data. For different application requirements, the latest verification schemes can also be classified
into static schemes (e.g., [JJ07], [ABC+ 07], [SW08]) and dynamic schemes (e.g.,
[EKPT09, SvDOJ11, CC12]). The static schemes consider static data, in which
the client cannot modify the original data. In these schemes, the client can perform a limited set of updates only. The dynamic schemes support the full range of
dynamic operations on the outsourced data, including modification, insertion and
deletion. Most existing PDP and POR schemes are designed for static data which
have infrequent modifications. In Erway et al. [EKPT09], dynamic PDP protocols
were proposed. However, designing efficient dynamic POR schemes is still an open
problem. Several papers [WWL+ 09], [ZX11] claimed to construct dynamic POR
protocols, but in fact only provided dynamic PDP schemes. Recently, Stefanov et
al. [SvDOJ11] proposed Iris, a system that supported dynamic POR, including protection against small data corruption. However, Iris brings additional cost to the
client because the parity data is required to be stored.
The main techniques for achieving secure and efficient remote data integrity
check can be summarized as follows:
(1) Use of a simple third-party verifier. As the simple hash method requires the
client to store numbers of hash values to do a remote integrity check, Shah et al.
[SBMS07] introduced a third-party verifier who could delegate the periodic task of
checking data integrity, in order to reduce the client’s storage, communicational and
computational cost. This simple solution, however, requires a third-party verifier to
keep a lot of hash values of the data blocks.
(2) Use of block ciphers. Tweakable block ciphers were used in Oprea et al.
[OR05] which allowed a client to detect the modification of data blocks by a remote
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and untrusted server. Their protocol did not bring additional storage cost to the
server and the client, but the entire file had to be retrieved during the verification
executions and the communication complexity is linear in the file size.
(3) Use of hash functions. Deswarte et al. [DQS04] and Filho et al. [FB06]
proposed RSA-based hash functions to verify remote data integrity. They allowed a
verifier to perform multiple challenges by using the same metadata. The limitation
of their algorithms lies in the computational complexity at the server, which must
exponentiate the entire data file, that is accessing all the data blocks. In addition,
RSA over the entire file is extremely slow. As is shown in Filho et at. [FB06], it
requires 20 seconds per megabyte for 1024-bit keys on a GHz3.0 CPU. Yamamoto
et al. [YOA07] presented an efficient scheme for large data integrity checks, based
on homomorphic hash functions. The advantage of their scheme is batch processing
[CY07] for a homomorphic hash function. Similar techniques can also be found in
Sebe et al. [SBD+ 04]. In [SBD+ 04], they presented a protocol based on the DiffieHellman problem in ZN , however in their scheme, the client has to store N bits per
data block (N is the RSA modulus) and the total storage cost on the client side is
O(n).
(4) Use of erasure-coded data. Schwarz and Miller [SM06] proposed a scheme
that used m/n erasure-correcting coding to safeguard the stored data. They used
algebraic signatures, which are hash functions with algebraic properties, to do the
verification. The algebraic properties ensured that the signature of the k parity
containers equaled the parity of the signatures of the m data blocks. However, in
their scheme, the file access, computation and communication complexity are all
linear in the number of data blocks per challenge. Moreover, this scheme receives
a less formal security analysis. Kotla et al. [KAD07] used a hierarchical erasure
coding in which both the client and server computed forward error correcting codes.
However, the server reveals the parameters of the encoding it uses to make storage
safe from failures.
(5) Use of “sentinels”. Juels et al. [JJ07] proposed a scheme for proof of retrievability using ‘sentinels’. The sentinels (special blocks) were hidden among other
blocks in file F . The verifier challenged the prover by specifying the positions of a
collection of sentinels and asking the prover to return the associated sentinel values.
Their scheme is limited, as they can handle only a limited number of queries and
increase storage overhead on the server side. In addition, the client needs to store
all the sentinels. Furthermore, it requires that the original x can be recovered from
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multiple challenges and responses. This is the main difference with the proposed
scheme. In Dodis et al. [DVW09], they improved the POR constructions and built
nearly optimal POR codes using hitting samplers and error-correcting codes.
(6) Use of homomorphic verifiable tags. Ateniese et al. [ABC+ 07, ABC+ 11] described a proof of data possession (PDP) scheme that improved the response length
of the simple hash scheme using homomorphic verifiable tags. In their scheme, they
constructed the homomorphic verifiable tags Ti for each data block mi . Later, the
P
prover sent a linear combination of blocks i ai mi (with arbitrary coefficients {ai })
P
to the verifier. The verifier cloud be convinced if i ai mi was correctly generated
using an aggregate tag T computed from {Ti }. They also proposed a variant of their
PDP scheme to achieve public verifiability under a weaker security model. Erway
et al. [EKPT09] introduced a framework and efficient constructions for dynamic
provable data possession which extends Ateniese et al.’s model [ABC+ 07] to support provable updates. Their constructions captured the dynamic operations such
as insertion in the middle of a file, however they are not efficient when moving and
deleting the entire files. Shacham and Waters [SW08] proposed two HTAG schemes
which used a simple homomorphic MAC and a universal hash family to reduce the
communication bits to a constant factor of k. One of their schemes supported private
verifiability and the other supports public verifiability. In Xu and Chang [XC12],
they improved the private verifiability scheme of Shacham and Waters’. The size
of a response (or proof) was dominated by s group elements where each was λ bits
long. Xu and Chang managed to aggregate these s group elements into two group
elements, leading to a reduction in proof size from O(s · λ) to O(λ) bits. Some other
schemes that also use homomorphic verifiable tags can be found in Chang and Xu
[CX08], Wang et al. [WWL+ 09], Wang et al. [WCW+ 09], Wang et al. [WWRL10],
Wang et al. [WWR+ 11] and Zeng [Zen08].
Organization of This Chapter. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
In Section 6.2, the framework and definitions are presented. In Section 6.3, the
main construction of the remote integrity check scheme is presented. In Section 6.4,
the full proofs of security is given in the random oracle model. In Section 6.5, the
complexity of the proposed protocol is analyzed, in the aspects of communication,
computation and storage costs. Experimental results are also given to show the
performance. Section 6.6 concludes this chapter.
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Framework

The framework for public remote integrity check in clouds is first described, as
shown in Figure 6.1. The public RIC protocol checks that the cloud storage retains
the outsourced data file M which can be divided into chunks of data blocks mi ’s.
Prior to outsourcing the data file, the data owner O pre-processes those mi ’s and
generates several homomorphic verifiable tags Ti ’s. Then the owner O outsources
his file M and all the tags Ti ’s to cloud storage and deletes them in local database.
The data format of M is independent here and it could be an encrypted file. Later,
the owner O outsources the periodic task of checking data integrity to some third
party verifier V. The third party verifier sends a challenge to the cloud server S
and asks S to respond based on the stored data blocks as well as the tags. Upon
successful completion of the protocol, V is convinced that the data file M has not
been altered or deleted by S. To conduct the protocol, V is only required to know
the public key of the data owner. In addition, no information about the data blocks
nor the tags are revealed to V. This framework is designed for the purpose of the
data owner O who wants to outsource the periodic task of data integrity checking,
but does not want to leak his/her data at the same time.
The Main Difference with Simple TPV Solutions. The main difference between the proposed RIC scheme and those remote integrity check schemes which use
third-party verifier (TPV), is that the proposed solution has constant storage and
communication cost by contrast of the multiple MACs that stored in the verifier’s
side. If one is to allow the TPV to store all the message authentication code for
all the data blocks, then the simple solution that introduce a third-party verifier
who can delegate the periodic task of checking data integrity, can reduce the data
owner’s storage, communicational and computational cost. However, this simple
solution require the TPV to store numbers of MACs which is linear to the number
of data chunks outsourced, and a large amount of bandwidth which is linear to the
number of queried blocks in the verification interaction.
Threat Model. The cloud server S must answer the challenges from the third
party verifier V. Failing to do so represents a data loss. However the cloud server
is not trusted, that is to say, the cloud server may try to convince the verifier that
it possesses the file even though the file is totally or partially missing. The cloud
server may have several motivations for misbehavior. For example, the server may
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(b) Outsource data to cloud servers

Cloud Storage

(a) Pre-process the data

M

m1

m2

M

F’
Chal ={(j, aj)|1≤ j ≤ l, aj

……

mi
Proof = (TP, TQ, TA, P, Q1, Q2)

F’=

T1

T2

……

Zp }

Ti

Check

PK { (ρ,r): 𝑃 = 𝑢ρ 𝑣 r }
PK { (t,s): 𝑄2 = 𝑔1 𝑡 𝑔2 𝑠 }
PK { (ρ,s): 𝐴 = 𝐵ρ 𝐶 s }
(c) Third-party remote integrity check

Figure 6.1: The framework of public RIC in cloud storage.

want to reclaim storage by discarding data that has not been or is rarely accessed,
or hide some data loss incidents due to management errors and hardware failures.
The third party verifier V must verify the integrity of the outsourced data. The
third-party verifier may not be fully-trusted as well. That is, the verifier may try
to retrieve the owner’s data through the process of verification. A public remote
integrity check protocol has to detect the cloud server’s misbehavior when the server
has deleted a fraction of the file. Moreover, it has to ensure that the third party
verifier cannot learn any outsourced data through executions.

6.2.1

Formal Definitions

The syntax of the proposed public remote integrity check scheme is given as follows.
In Section 6.4, the security definition will be given formally.
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Definition 6.1 (Public Remote Integrity Check Scheme) A public RIC scheme consists of two polynomial-time algorithms (KeyGen, TagGen) and an interactive protocol (Proof ) that captures the properties including data possession and public verification without disclosing data.
KeyGen. This algorithm is run by the data owner. It takes a security parameter
k as input and outputs a pair of matching public and secret keys (pk, sk).
TagGen. This algorithm is run by the data owner to generate the homomorphic
tags for the data chunks. It takes as inputs a public key pk, a secret keysk and a
data block mi , outputs the homomorphic tag Ti for this data block mi .
Proof. This is a pair of interactive algorithms (ProofS , ProofV ) executed by
the cloud server and a public verifier respectively. The input of ProofS is a public
key pk, a set of data blocks and homomorphic tags {mi , Ti }. The input of ProofV
is a public key pk. Upon completion of the protocol, ProofV outputs 1 if the proof
is accepted, and 0 otherwise.
Definition 6.2 (Correctness) A public remote integrity check scheme is correct if
for all key pairs (pk, sk) output by KeyGen, for all the tags Ti output by TagGen
with input mi , sk, ProofV with input pk outputs 1 if it is interacting with ProofS
with input pk, {Ti , mi }.

6.3

The Proposed Scheme

Firstly, the main construction of the proposed scheme is described. The construction
is based on the scheme from [SW08]. Zero-knowledge proof techniques are incorporated into their scheme so that the verifier does not learn anything about the data
during the proof protocol. Secondly, how a public RIC system can be constructed
is shown.

6.3.1

Main Construction

Let e : G × G → GT be a computable bilinear map with |G| = |GT | = p for
some large prime p. Let g, g1 , g2 , u and v be generators of G. The scheme also
employs a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G, viewed as a random oracle. Details of
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the construction of a hash function whose range is the group G has been described
in [BLS01]. The main construction of the proposed scheme is as follows:
KeyGen. Select a random x ∈ Zp , this algorithm generates the public key as
(g x , g, g1 , g2 , u, v) . The secret key is x.
TagGen((sk, mi ) → Ti ).

Before generating the tags, the data file M is pre-

processed into n data blocks m1 , m2 , ..., mn ∈ Zp . In the following each data block
will be referred as mi for 1 6 i 6 n. This algorithm then generates a homomorphic
tag Ti for data block mi , where Ti = (H(i) · umi )x .
Proof. The pair of algorithms ProofS , ProofV interacts as follows.
• ProofV chooses a set of data blocks for challenge. Let I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be the
index set for the blocks to be challenged. ProofV randomly chooses c, d ∈R Zp ,
computes D = g1c g2d . ProofV randomly picks aj ∈R Zp for j ∈ I and sends
I, {aj }j∈I , D to ProofS as the challenge.
Q
P
a
x
• ProofS computes T = j∈I Tj j , ρ =
j∈I aj mj , B = e(u, g ) and C =
e(g1 , g). ProofS then randomly chooses r, s, t, tρ , tr , tt , ts ∈R Zp and computes
TP = utρ · v tr , TQ = g1tt · g2ts , TA = B tρ · C ts ,
P = uρ · v r , Q1 = T · g1s , Q2 = g1t · g2s .
ProofS sends (TP , TQ , TA , P, Q1 , Q2 ) to ProofV .
• ProofV sends (c, d) to ProofS .
• ProofS checks if D = g1c g2d and computes
zρ = tρ − c · ρ, zr = tr − c · r,
zt = tt − c · t,

zs = ts − c · s

and sends (zρ , zr , zt , zs ) to ProofV .
• P V outputs 1 if and only if all the following equations hold
?

TP = P c · uzρ · v zr

(6.1a)

?

TQ = Qc2 · g1zt · g2zs


? 
TA = 



e(Q1 , g)

 · B zρ · C zs , j ∈ I
l
Q

e( H(j)aj , g x )
j=1

and 0 otherwise.

(6.1b)
c
(6.1c)
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A Brief Explanation of The Proposed Protocol

Note that a tuple (T, ρ) satisfying the equation
Y
e(T, g) = e( (H(j)aj )uρ , v)
j∈I

is a proof-of-retrievability of the messages {mj }j∈I according to [SW08]. Instead
of requiring the cloud server to send (T, ρ) to the verifier (which leaks information
about the data), the protocol ProofS is modified so that it is a zero-knowledge proofof-knowledge of the tuple (T, ρ) satisfying the above equation. Indeed, the message

flow ℘ = D, (TP , TQ , TA , P, Q1 , Q2 ), (c, d), (zρ , zr , zt , zs ) can be viewed as a zeroknowledge proof-of-knowledge of such a tuple. Intuitively, the proposed protocol is
secure if [SW08] is a secure proof-of-retrievability and that ℘ is a zero-knowledge
proof-of-knowledge protocol with soundness.

6.3.3

A Public RIC System

Now a public RIC system can be constructed as Figure 6.2, from the above scheme
in three phases: Setup, Challenge and P roof . It should be emphasized that the
cloud server does not send back to the verifier any of the data file blocks and not
even their sum. Additionally, the third-party verifier checks the integrity of the
outsourced file without having the secret key. In particular, the third-party verifier
does not retrieve any information about the data even when the challenge only
consists of a single block.

6.4

Security Analysis

Two security requirements are identified for the proposed scheme. The first one
regards data possession. Specifically, an adversary cannot successfully construct
a valid proof without possessing all the blocks corresponding to a given challenge,
unless it guesses all the missing blocks. The second one is to capture public verification without disclosing data. No third party verifier should be able to
retrieve any data or tag information in probabilistic polynomial time. To formalize
this notion, it is required that for any verifier, a PPT simulator can be constructed
to simulate the view of the verifier without the knowledge of the messages and
homomorphic tags.
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• Setup: The data owner O invokes the algorithm KeyGen to generate a
pair of matching public and secret keys (pk, sk). O then invokes T agGen
for all data blocks (1 6 i 6 n) and sends all the homomorphic tags Ti ’s
to the cloud server S, along with pk and mi ’s. O may now delete the
original data file M and all the tags Ti ’s from his local storage.
• Challenge: The third-party verifier V requests remote integrity check
for l distinct blocks of the data file M (with 1 6 l 6 n):
1. V generates a challenge chal = {(j, aj )|1 6 j 6 l, aj ∈R Zp } and
sends chal to S.
2. S computes (TP , TQ , TA , P, Q1 , Q2 ) as follows: TP = utρ · v tr , TQ =
s
g1tt · g2tQ
, TA = B tρ · C tsP
, P = uρ · v r , Q1 = T · g1s , Q2 = g1t · g2s where
aj
x
T = j∈I Tj , ρ =
j∈I aj mj , B = e(u, g ) and C = e(g1 , g).
(TP , TQ , TA , P, Q1 , Q2 ) is returned to V.
3. V generates a random challenge c.
4. S computes zρ = tρ − c · ρ, zr = tr − c · r, zt = tt − c · t, zs = ts − c · s,
and returns (zρ , zr , zt , zs ) to V.
• Proof: V checks the integrity of the outsourced data without either
having the data or the secret key sk:
1. V computes A =

e(Q1 ,g)
.
l
Q
e(
H(j)aj ,g x )
j=1

2. V checks the validity of the proof by verifying whether the three
equations 6.1a, 6.1b and 6.1c hold.
Figure 6.2: A Public RIC System
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Data Possession

This requirement is formalized by using a security game played between a challenger
C and an adversary A. A public RIC protocol is sound if any cloud server that convinces an honest verifier is in possession of the data file M . Following the definition
in [HZY11], it means that there exists an extractor algorithm that can extract the
data file M when it is interacting with the cloud server in the public RIC protocol.
Data Possession:
In the DP-game, the challenger C denotes the third-party verifier and the adversary A = (A1 , A2 ) denotes a cheating cloud server. The game is divided into two
phases, the learning phase and the proof phase.
• Setup: The challenger C runs KeyGen to generate a keypair (pk, sk), and
sends pk to the adversary A.
• Query: The adversary A can make at most qs queries to a tag oracle, providing
some file block mi during each query. C then computes all the homomorphic
tags Ti and sends them back to A, along with all the mi ’s. The adversary
stores all the mi ’s and the corresponding tags Ti ’s.
• Execute: The adversary A can undertake at most qe executions of public
RIC protocol for any file M that he has made a tag query, with specifying the
corresponding Ti ’s.
• Proof: The adversary A outputs the description of a prover machine P and
the set of messages M ⊂ {1, . . . , qs } to be challenged. C interacts with P in
the proof protocol with M being the set of messages to be challenged.
Informally speaking, the data possession property requires that if P can pass
through the verification protocol with C, P should be in possession of all messages
mi for i ∈ M. This is formalized as follows.
Definition 6.3 (Soundness) A public remote integrity check scheme is sound if
there exists a knowledge extractor K that can recover {mi |i ∈ M} from the prover
machine P with non-negligible probability.
Theorem 6.1 The construction of a public RIC system captures data possession if
Waters public-verification scheme is secure in the random oracle model.
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In the following it shows how to construct the extractor K. Note that K will
only be used in proofs. It is an algorithm that runs in probabilistic polynomial
time on input P , pk and the index set M. The output of K is the set of messages
{mi |i ∈ M}
The knowledge extractor K will work in the following way: If the prover P
responds correctly to an initial challenge c, then K will rewind P and issue a different
challenge c0 for which P also responds correctly. Note that this requires K to have
the discrete logarithm of g2 to base g1 so that it can issue two different challenges
for the same value D. If K can find two such challenges c and c0 , then K has the
following equations:
0

0

0

TP = P c · uzρ · v zr = P c · uzρ · v zr ,
0

0

0

TQ = Qc2 · g1zt · g2zs = Qc2 · g1zt · g2zs ,
0

0

0

TA = Ac · B zρ · C zs = Ac · B zρ · C zs .
Now it can get
u zρ · v zr
Pc
=
,
P c0
u zρ 0 · v zr 0
g1zt · g2zs
Qc2
=
0
0
0,
Qc2
g1zt · g2zs
Ac
B zρ · C zs
.
=
A c0
B zρ 0 · C zs 0
If denotes 4c = c0 − c, 4zρ = zρ 0 − zρ , 4zr = zr 0 − zr , 4zt = zt 0 − zt and
4zs = zs 0 − zs , from the above equations it can have
4zρ

4zr

P = u− 4c v − 4c ,
−

Q2 = g1

4zt
4c

s
− 4z
4c

g2

4zρ

,

4zs

A = B − 4c C − 4c .
Then, it has
e(Q1 ,g)
l
Q
e(
H(j)aj ,g x )

4zρ

4zs

= e(u− 4c , g x ) · e(g1 , g)− 4c .

j=1

That is,
4zs

e(Q1 · g14c , g) = e(

l
Q
j=1

4zρ

H(j)aj , g x ) · e(u− 4c , g x ).
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4zs

Thus K can compute T = Q1 · g14c and ρ = −4zρ /4c. In [SW08], it has been
proven under the CDH assumption that ρ must be correctly formed. That is, note
that ρ is a linear equation of the form a1 m1 + a2 m2 + · · · + al ml . Then by choosing
independent coefficients a1 , a2 , · · · , al in l executions of the extraction above on the
same blocks m1 , m2 , · · · , ml , K can obtain l independent linear equations in the
variables m1 , m2 , · · · ml . Thus K can solve these equations to obtain the data file M
that contain blocks m1 , m2 , · · · , ml .
The extraction is required to be succeed (with all but negligible probability)
from the prover (adversary) that causes the verifier (challenger) to accept with a
non-negligible probability . Then the extractor K can recover enough blocks to
reconstruct the original M from such an adversary will take O(n/) interactions.

6.4.2

Public Verification without Disclosing Data

To capture the requirement of public verification without disclosing data, it is required that there exists a PPT simulator S which is capable of simulating the view
of any verifier given that the public parameters and the public key of the user as
input. In other words, the RIC protocol is zero-knowledge.
Theorem 6.2 The proposed public remote integrity check protocol is a RIC protocol
is zero-knowledge.
Proof:

In order to prove that the public RIC protocol is a zero-knowledge (ZK)

proof system, one needs to prove three properties: completeness, soundness and
zero-knowledge.
Completeness. Suppose the honest prover posses the secret M just as required in
GenProof. It is straightforward that the prover can always convince the verifier to
accept the proof. Thus the perfect completeness condition follows.
Soundness. To show soundness (namely that even an arbitrarily malicious prover
P ∗ can not convince the verifier V to accept a false statement with more than a
negligible probability), how to extract a witness M from two different runs of the
proposed protocol is first demonstrated.
Assume there are two different transcripts of the proposed protocol, the extractor K can be constructed in the following way that as described in section 6.4.1.
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Having O(n/) interactions, the extractor K can recover enough blocks to reconstruct the original M from a malicious prover P ∗ . In such a case, T = Q1 · g

4zs
4c

and ρ = −4zρ /4c can be efficiently computed from the transcripts. Thus it can be
concluded that for any first round message (TP , TQ , TA , P, Q1 , Q2 ) that P ∗ may send
to V , there is at most one possible challenge c which P ∗ could answer correctly.
Then P ∗ can effectively compute a witness as above. However P ∗ must decided
upon its first round message before seeing the challenge and therefore will receive
1
p

the “correct” challenge c with probability at most

which is negligible.

Honest Verifier Zero-knowledge. To show that the proposed protocol is zeroknowledge, it is necessary to describe an efficient simulator S that interacts with
any verifier, and produces an interaction that is indistinguishable from the verifier’s
interaction with the prover.
• The verifier sends the values I, {ai }, D to S.
• S randomly picks and sends TP0 , TQ0 , TA0 , P 0 , Q01 , Q02 ∈R G to the verifier.
• The verifier returns (c, d) to S.
• S validates D = g1c g2d and rewinds the verifier to the point when it receives the
tuples (I, {ai }, D).
• S randomly picks zρ , zr , zt , zs ∈R Zp , P, Q1 , Q2 ∈R G and computes the following values:
TP = P c uzρ v zr
TQ = Qc2 · g1zt · g2zs



TA = 


c


e(Q1 , g)

 · B zρ · C zs
l
Q

e( H(j)aj , g x )
j=1

• S sends TP , TQ , TA to the verifier.
• The verifier returns (c, d) to S. Under the discrete logarithm assumption, the
values (c, d) will be the same with the first run.
• S returns zρ , zr , zt , zs to the verifier.
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Note that the distribution of P , Q1 , Q2 is identical to the real one computable
by the prover since for any value of ρ and T , there exists random numbers r, s, t such
that P = uρ v r , Q1 = T g s and Q2 = g1t g2s . Similarly, for any values of ρ, t, r, s there
exists random numbers tρ , tt , tr , ts such that zρ = tρ − cρ, zt = tt − ct, zr = tr − cr
and zs = ts − ts. Thus, the view of the verifier interacting with the simulator S is
identical to that of the real prover.

6.5

Performance Analysis

6.5.1

Complexity Analysis

In this section, the complexity of the proposed scheme is analyzed, in the aspects of
communication, computation and storage costs. In particular, the proposed scheme
is compared with the one proposed in [HZY11].
Communication Costs. Unlike [HZY11], the proposed scheme does not only consider the communication costs in Proof phase, but also consider the communication
cost in Setup phase as the communications on the client side only occur in Setup
phase. As mentioned in Table 1, the client side communication cost is O(1) in the
proposed protocol, while is O(n) in [HZY11] as it requires the client to releases all
the tags to every possible verifier. The verifier side communication cost is O(c) in
the proposed protocol while is O(1) in [HZY11]. As the sampling block number c is
much more smaller than the total block number n, for example, c = 460 or 300, the
sum cost O(1) + O(c) in the proposed scheme is lower than O(1) + O(n) in [HZY11].
Storage Costs. The storage cost mainly occurs on the server side as all the data
chunks and homomorphic tags have been outsourced to the cloud storage. Separate
analysis of the storage cost is given on the client side, the server side and the verifier
side. A detailed comparison with [HZY11] is drawn .
• Client side. In [HZY11], the client needs to store the public key and the
private key. The storage cost is 2|N | + |p| + |q| bits (|N | = 1024 bits). In the
proposed scheme, the client also needs to store the pair of matching public
and secret keys (pk, sk), however with the lower storage cost as 7|p| bits (e.g.,
|p| = 160 bits).
• Verifier side. The verifier needs to store the public key pk in the proposed
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scheme. The storage cost is only 6|p| bits. However in [HZY11], the verifier is
required to store all the RSA-based tags. The storage cost of the tags is linear
to the total number of blocks, that upper bounded by d|m|/le · |N | bits. Here
|m| denotes the total length of the outsourced data and l denotes the length
of each data block.
• Server side. The cloud server needs to store all the data chunks and the tags.
The storage cost on the server side is |m| + d|m|/le · |p| bits in the proposed
scheme while it is higher in [HZY11] with |m| + d|m|/le · |N | bits.
Computation Costs. Separate analysis of the computation costs is also given on
the client side, the server side and the verifier side.
• Client side. The computation cost on the client side only occurs in Setup
phase, for generating the homomorphic tags. It is O(n) in [HZY11]. As modulo operations are far more efficient than the modular exponentiations, only
the latter is considered as [HZY11]. The computation cost of the client is
d|m|/le

2d|m|/leTexp (|p|, p) + Thash

d|m|/le

+ Tmulti , where Texp (len, num) is the time cost

for computing a modular exponentiation with a len-bit long exponent modular
n
n
num, Thash
is the time cost of hashing n values into the group G and Tmult

is the time cost of n multiplications. The time complexity in the proposed
scheme is also O(n).
• Verifier side. During the verification in the proposed scheme, the verifier
needs to check whether the three equations hold. It contains (9 + c) modular
exponentiations, four pairings and (c−1+2+2+2) multiplications in group G.
c+5
4
The computation cost in verifier side is (9+c)Texp (|p|, p)+Tpairing
+Tmult
, where
n
c is the sampling block number and Tpairing
is the time cost of n pairings. The

time complexity in the proposed scheme is O(c) while it is O(2n ) in [HZY11].
• Server side. In the proposed scheme, the main computation cost on the
server side occurs for generating the proof, as the server needs to compute
(11 + c) modular exponentiations, two pairings, (c + 5) multiplications and
(c − 1) additions. The computation cost for generating the response is much
lower, which only contains four additions and four multiplications in group G.
Thus the sum cost for computation on the server side is (11 + c)Texp (|p|, p) +
c+9
c+3
2
n
, where Tadd
is the time cost of n additions in group
Tpairing
+ Tmult
+ Tadd
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G. The time complexity in the proposed scheme is O(c), while it is O(2n ) in
[HZY11].

6.5.2

Performance Analysis

The performance of the proposed scheme is now assessed. This analysis focuses on
the extra computation cost that is introduced by the proposal. The experiment
is conducted by using Turbo C on a Windows 7 system with an Intel Core Duo
processor running at 2.53GHz and 4.00GB of RAM. All the algorithms use the
Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) library version 0.5.12. The elliptic curve utilized
in the experiment is an MNT curve that has a 160-bit group order, with base field
size of 512 bits and the embedding degree k = 2. All experimental results present
the mean of 20 trials.
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Figure 6.3: Comparison on computation time cost for verifying the proof on verifier
side, between the proposed scheme and [HZY11].

The analysis begins by estimating the computation cost on client side. From
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Table 7.1, it can be seen that the processing time increases linearly with the data
block number n. Compared with the protocol [HZY11] in which is also implemented
by Turbo C and Miracl library on the same platform, the process executions of the
proposed scheme cost much. The main reason is that, for a same file F , the block
F
number is d 1024
e in [HZY11] where the length of each data block is chosen to be
F
e in the proposed scheme.
1024 bits, and the block number is d 160

600
[HZY11]
Proposed

500

Time (ms)

400

300

200

100

0

0

50

100

150

200
250
300
Block number n

350

400

450

500

Figure 6.4: Comparison on computation time cost for generating the proof on server
side, between the proposed scheme and [HZY11].

The experimental results show that the computation costs are fewer on both of
verifier side and server side in the proposed scheme, comparing with the proposed
one in [HZY11]. For a fair comparison, the cost of processing all data blocks is
compared, though the proposed scheme supports sampling in which a much smaller
number of blocks is challenged, for a slightly degraded soundness guarantee (to
achieve an accuracy of 99%, a sample of 460 blocks is often sufficient). As shown
in Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4, the processing time of the proposed scheme is slightly
better than [HZY11] even without sampling. If c = 460 blocks are sampled for 99
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percent accuracy, the processing time would keep at around 69ms, regardless of the
actual file size. This indicates that for data files which have large file size or frequent
integrity check, the proposed scheme is highly efficient.
Table 6.2: The processing time for generating the homomorphic tags on client side.
The length of each data block |mi | is set to be 160 bits.
File Size (KB)

6.6

The Proposed Scheme
sampling block number

processing time (ms)

1.25

64

725

2.5

l28

1443

5

256

2798

10

512

5518

Conclusion

In this chapter, a public RIC scheme is presented for privacy-preserving remote integrity check in cloud storage. The proposed scheme achieves data possession and
protection against malicious third party verifiers. It ensures no leakage of both
the verified data and the tags during the protocol executions. The security of the
proposed scheme has been proven in the random oracle model. The performance
analysis and experimental results show that the proposed scheme is efficient, especially when the size of the data file is large or the integrity check is frequent.

Chapter 7
PMOW: Proof of Multiparty Ownership
for Encrypted Data in Clouds
The notion of proof of ownership (POW) in clouds was introduced by Halevi et
al. [HHPSP11]. In their scheme, a user could efficiently prove that he holds the
file, rather than some short information. However, their scheme could not support
either multiple users application or encrypted file scenario. It is observed that
there are applications where different users share the ownership of the outsourced
file. Thus in this chapter, an innovative PMOW scheme is proposed for proof of
multiparty ownership with the encrypted data in cloud. Every user can prove he
holds the plaintext of the encrypted file when the server stores one ciphertext only.
The proposed solution achieves CCA2 security and Full proof analysis is also given
under the ideal cipher model.

7.1

Introduction

Currently, cloud storage is becoming more popular. A promising technology called
deduplication has been applied to reduce the cost of the cloud storage. Deduplication
is essentially a data compression technique for elimination of redundant data. A
typical flavor of deduplication detects duplicate data blocks within the storage device
and deduplicates them by placing pointers rather than storing multiple copies at
various places within the disk.
Client-side deduplication in cloud storage attempts to save the bandwidth of
uploading copies for the existing files to the server. It enables the cloud server to
store a single copy of repeating data. In a typical cloud storage with client-side
deduplication, e.g. Dropbox 1 , Wuala and MozyHome, the user sends to the server
1

It is noticed that Dropbox disabled the deduplication across different users (in Feb 2012), probably due to recent vulnerabilities discovered in their original cross-user client-side deduplication
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a hash of the file before uploading. Then the server checks whether this hash value
is already in the database. If so, the server claims that the file is already in the cloud
storage and is not needed to upload. Recently, Harnik et al. [HPSP10] addressed the
security problems of client-side deduplication. A malicious user who gets the hash
signature of a file can convince the cloud server about his ownership. By accepting
the hash value as a “proxy” for the entire file, the cloud server allows anyone who
gets the hash value to access the entire file. To overcome such attacks, Halevi et
al. [HHPSP11] introduced the notion of proofs-of-ownership (POW). In addition,
they present Merkle-tree based schemes to allow an user efficiently prove about the
user’s ownership, rather than some short information. The POW protocol works by
first encoding the file F using an encoding function E which is resilient to erasure
of up to α fraction of the bits, and then building a Merkle-tree over the encoded file
F 0 = E(F ). Let H be a collision resistant hash function with output length of λ bits.
Let M TH,λ (F 0 ) be the binary Merkle-tree over buffer F 0 by using λ-bit leaves and
the hash function H. On M -bit input file F ∈ {0, 1}M , the server who is the verifier
computes the encoded F 0 = E(F ) and builds the Merkle-tree M TH,λ (F 0 ). After
that, the server stores the root node Hroot of the Merkle-tree. During the protocol
execution of POW, the server randomly chooses u leaf indexes, l1 , l2 , · · · , lu , where
u is the smallest integer such that (1 − α)u <  ( is the desired soundness bound).
The server then enquires the sibling-paths of all the leaves from the prover, and
accepts if all are valid with respect to M TH,λ (F 0 ).
However, the state-of-the-art work by Halevi et al. [HHPSP11] cannot be adopted
directly for a joint ownership where multiple users share the ownership of the input
file F , because the protocol execution is related to the proven file only. Additionally,
their scheme cannot be adopted for encrypted file scenario, because encryption of
the same file by different users with random keys results in different ciphertexts.
The server cannot store the same hash root value for ownership verification.
There are applications of ownership sharing by different users. For example,
multiple members in a workgroup share the ownership of some working documents
in clouds. No one can delete the files individually before the files are not downloaded by every member. These working documents are usually be encrypted before
outsourcing, for security and privacy considerations. The cloud provider who has
access to the storage infrastructure, can neither be considered as a fully trusted
method. This also indicates the importance and urgency in the study of security in client-side
deduplication.
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Table 7.1: Comparisons between previous schemes and the proposed scheme.
[NWZ12] [PS12] [ZX12] [XCZ13] Proposed Scheme
Proof of ownership
X
X
X
X
X
Privacy
X
×
X
X
X
Encrypted files
X
×
X
×
X
Joint ownership
×
×
×
×
X
party nor a resistance to attacks. Thus in this chapter, a solution for proof of a multiparty ownership with the encrypted data is designed. Every user can prove that
he holds the plaintext of the encrypted file when the server stores one ciphertext
only. The proposed protocol is called as proof of multiparty ownership (PMOW)
to emphasize its simplicity.
Main Contributions. The main contributions of this chapter can be illustrated
as following: 1) PMOW is proposed. This protocol helps different users prove the
joint ownership of encrypted files for client-side deduplication in clouds. 2) CCA2
security against arbitrary adversaries is achieved under the ideal cipher model.
Comparison.
A comparison is made between the proposed PMOW scheme and some selected
existing schemes in Table 7.1. The comparison is mainly based on the following
requirements and properties:
• Proof of ownership. A malicious user who gets some partial information of a
file cannot convince the verifier about his ownership.
• Privacy. During a proof of ownership execution, only the privileged users
should obtain access to the client’s data files. In other words, the verifier who
has access to the storage infrastructure, can neither be considered as a fully
trusted party nor a resistance to attacks.
• Encrypted files. The proof of ownership protocol should be applied to encrypted files scenario.
• Joint ownership. The proof of ownership protocol should support the applications of ownership sharing by different users.
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Related Work. Proof-of-ownership (POW) is closely related to two other similar
problems: proof of retrievability (POR) and proof data possession (PDP). POR
schemes [JJ07], [SW08], [BJO09], [DVW09], [ZX11] are challenge-response protocols. In POR schemes, a cloud provider demonstrates the file retrievability (i.e.,
recoverability without any loss or corruption) to a client. PDP schemes [ABC+ 07],
[ABC+ 11], [EKPT09], [SFB+ 08], [FB06], [SBD+ 04], [WWL+ 09, WWRL10, WWR+ 11,
ZB12, YOA07] are similar protocols which only detect a large amount of corruption
in outsourced data. The main difference between POW and POR/PDP is that the
latter usually use a pre-processing step on the client side, while the former does not.
POW protocols are proposed for client-side data deduplication that enables the
storage server to store a single copy of repeating data. Cilent-side data deduplication
has become popular and important as it removes data redundancy and data replication, but it brings many data privacy and security issues for the user. Douceur
et al. [DAB+ 02] first studied the problem of deduplication in a multi-tenant system
in which deduplication had to be reconciled with confidentiality. Their proposed
convergent encryption enabled two users to produce a single ciphertext for deduplication. As there are many security problems of convergent encryption, Storer et al.
[SGLM08] proposed a security model to secure data deduplication.
Recently, Harnik et al. [HPSP10] formally identified the security problems of
client-side deduplication as follows: 1) The first kind of attacks attempted to fool
the storage server and abuse the storage system. A malicious user with the hash
signature of a file could convince the cloud server about his ownership. By accepting
the hash value as a ‘proxy’ for the entire file, the cloud server allowed anyone who
held the hash value to access the entire file. 2) The second kind of attacks targeted
the privacy and confidentiality of users of the storage system. A malicious user could
check whether another honest user had already outsourced a data file by trying to
upload it as well. 3) The third kind of attacks focused on subverting the intended
use of a storage system. For example, two malicious users tried to use the cloud
storage for a convert channel as they might not have a direct interaction channel.
These two users first pre-agreed on two different files. Second, one malicious user
outsourced one of the two files. Then the other user could detect which file had been
deduplicated and output either 0 (for the fist file) or 1 (for the second file). In this
way, two malicious users successfully exchange a bit of information without a direct
transmitting channel.
To overcome such attacks, Halevi et al. [HHPSP11] introduced the notion of
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POW for client-side deduplication. In addition, they presented Merkle tree-based
schemes to allow a user to efficiently prove his ownership to the server, rather than
short information about the file such as a hash value. However, the state-of-the-art
work [HHPSP11] cannot be adopted directly for multiple users who share the ownership of the input file F . In addition, their scheme cannot be adopted for encrypted
file scenarios, as mentioned before. Some other schemes [RMW12], [NWZ12], [PS12],
[ZX12], [XCZ13] focused on improving efficiency of POW, or applying an encrypted
file scenario. In [PS12], Pietro and Sorniottis proposed three correlative protocols
to achieve an efficient POW for deduplication. The main idea of their protocols is
to challenge random K bits of file F . The probability that a malicious user is able
to output the correct value of K bits of the file, where each bit selected at a random
position, is negligible in the security parameter k. However, their scheme cannot
be adopted for encrypted file scenarios. In addition, the client’s files are totally
revealed to the cloud server during the protocol executions. Zheng et al. [ZX12]
argued that the public verifiability offered by POR/PDP schemes could be naturally exploited to achieve POW, however by using POR/PDP schemes to achieve
POW, their scheme brings the clients mass information because it stores all the
verified tags. In [NWZ12], they presented a private POW scheme for encrypted
files in cloud storage. In [XCZ13], they proposed a secure client-side deduplication
scheme to protect data confidentiality (and some partial information) against both
outside adversaries and honest-but-curious cloud storage server, while Halevi et al.
[HHPSP11] trusted cloud storage server in data confidentiality. However, none of
the above schemes can solve the POW problem for multiparty users because the
protocol executions are only related to the file that has to be proven.

7.2

Technique Preliminaries

This section starts by describing the framework for proof of multiparty ownership
in cloud storage, as shown in Figure 7.1. The PMOW protocol checks whether
every user has the ownership of the file F . Prior to outsource the data file, the
client C encrypts the file, chooses a random symmetric key k and generates several
ciphertexts CTi (k) for users Ui , 1 6 i 6 n. Then the client C outsources the
ciphertexts (CTF , {CTi (k)}) to cloud server V who is the verifier in the protocol. V
uses an erasure-code R to pre-process the input buffer CTF and divides R(CTF ) into
blocks mj , 1 6 j 6 m. These blocks are hashed in pairs until the root node Hroot
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U1

CTF, {CTi} 1≤i≤n

Client

V

……

C

Cloud server

Un
Proofi = (A,Ti1,Ti2,Ti3,Ti4,Ti5,{mji},{Pji})

Figure 7.1: The framework for proof of multiparty ownership in cloud.
is reached, as described in Figure 7.2. By generating such a Merkle-tree M TH,λ , V
can compute a short verification information v which is the root node of the tree.
Later at a time, the multiple users Ui who share the file ownership download the
ciphertexts and decrypt the symmetric key k and the file F ulteriorly. V sends
a challenge to every user in the set and asks a proof based on the file F . Upon
successfully completion of the protocol, the cloud server V is convinced that every
user Ui (1 6 i 6 n) has the file F . To conduct the protocol, V only needs to know
the short verification information v. In addition, no information about F is revealed
to V.
Theat Model. The multiple users Ui must answer the challenges from the cloud
server (verifier) V. If the users are failing to do so, it represents a failing joint proof
of ownership. However the users are not trusted, that is to say, some of the users
may try to convince the verifier alone with their own proofs. The motivations can
be various for their misbehavior. For example, a malicious user wants to tamper
with the working group’s documents by giving the verifier an forged ownership proof
which should be generated by all the group members. Additionally, the cloud server
V must verify the multiparty ownership of the stored encrypted file. However the
cloud server may not be fully trusted as well. That is to say, the cloud server may
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Figure 7.2: Build the Merkle-Tree.

try to retrieve the client C’s file through the proof protocol executions. A PMOW
protocol must detect the misbehavior of the users when someone cheats with the
forged joint proof of ownership. Moreover, it has to ensure that the cloud server
cannot learn any outsourced files through all the protocol executions.

7.2.1

Preliminaries

In this section, some notations are defined and the cryptographic tools which are
used as building blocks in PMOW construction are reviewed.
Notations. Let λ be a security parameter, a function (λ) is negligible if it is
smaller than λ−const for any const and sufficiently large λ. Let p be a large prime
and G be a group of prime order p. Let H(·) be a collision-resistant hash function
that maps binary strings of arbitrary length to binary strings of a fixed length, i.e.,
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ . The scheme also employs an erasure-code R(·) : {0, 1}F →
0

{0, 1}F , resilient to erasure of α fraction of the bits (for some constant α > 0).
Namely, from any (1 − α)M 0 bits of R(F ) it is possible to recover the original F .
Let Enc, Dec be the symmetric encryption/decryption algorithms. Denote M TH,λ
(with respect to hash function H) as the Merkle-tree and M T PH (v, m, u) as the

7.2. Technique Preliminaries

99

Merkle-tree protocol where the verifier knows the root value v and number of leaves
m, and asks to see u leaves of the tree and their sibling paths.
Merkle-tree Lemma. A Merkle tree can provide a commitment to a large input
file. With this commitment, it is later possible to verify individual blocks of the
file without giving the entire input buffer. The same method is used to construct
the Merkle tree in [HHPSP11] . Firstly, the large input file is divided into blocks.
Secondly, group these blocks in pairs and use a collision-resistant hash function to
hash each pair. Then the hash values are grouped again in pairs and each pair
is further hashed until reach the root hash value. At last it constructs a binary
tree with the leaves corresponding to the file blocks and the root corresponding
to the last remaining hash value. In the following the notations in [HHPSP11]
are used. M TH,λ (with respect to hash function H) denotes the Merkle-tree and
M T PH (v, m, u) denotes the Merkle-tree protocol where the verifier knows the root
value v and number of leaves m, and asks to see u leaves of the tree and their sibling
paths (for a leaf node l ∈ M TH,λ , the sibling path of l consists of all the sibling nodes
on the path from l to the root). The following lemma shows that every prover that
passes the Merkle-tree protocol with high enough probability can be converted into
an extractor that extracts most of the leaves of the tree. The security of Merkle-tree
lemma has been proved in [HHPSP11].
Lemma 7.1 There exists a black-box extractor K with oracle access to a Merkle-tree
prover, that has the following properties:
• For every prover P and v ∈ {0, 1}∗ , m, u ∈ N and β ∈ [0, 1], KP (v, m, u, β)
makes at most

u2 s(log(s)+1)
β

calls to its prover oracle P .

• Fix any hash function h and input buffer F with m leaves of λ-bits each, and
let v be the root value of M Th,λ . Also fix some u ∈ N and a prover (that may
depend on h, F and u) P ∗ = P ∗ (h, F, u).
Then if P ∗ has probability at least (1−α)u +β of convincing the verifier in M T Ph (v, m, u)
(for some α, β ∈ (0, 1]), then with probability at least

1
4

( over its internal random-

P∗

ness) the extractor K (v, m, u, β) outputs values for at least a (1 − α)-fraction of
the leaves of the tree, together with valid sibling paths for all the leaves.
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Formal Definitions

The syntax of the proposed proof of multiparty ownership (PMOW) scheme is
given as follows.
Definition 7.1 (Proof of Multiparty Ownership Scheme) A proof of multiparty ownership scheme consists of four polynomial-time algorithms (KeyGenC , KeyGenU ,
F ileP repC , F ileP repU ) and an interactive multiparty protocol (Proof ) that captures
the properties including strong proof-of-ownership.
KeyGenC . This algorithm is run by the client who outsource the file. This
algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ and gives as output the client’s key
pair (CP K, CSK).
KeyGenU . This algorithm is run by the user. KeyGenU takes as input the
security parameter λ and outputs a pair of matching public and secret keys (P K,
SK).
FilePrepC . This algorithm is run by the client to prepare the file before outsourcing. It takes as input (F ,P KUi ,CSK) and gives as output the ciphertext of
CTF .
FilePrepV . This algorithm is run by the cloud server to prepare the verification
information. It takes as input CTF and gives as output the verification information
v on file CTF .
Proof. This is a tuple of multiparty interactive algorithms ({ProofUi }, ProofV )
executed by the users and the cloud server (verifier) respectively. The input of
ProofUi is (CTF , CP K, SKUi ). The input of ProofV is (v, P KUi , CTF ). Upon
completion of the protocol, ProofV outputs 1 if the proof is accepted, and 0 otherwise.
Definition 7.2 (Correctness) A proof of multiparty ownership scheme is correct if
for (CP K, CSK) output by KeyGenC , for all key pairs (P K, SK) output by
KeyGenU , for all CTF output by FilePrepC with input (F ,P KUi ,CSK), for all
verification information v output by FilePrepV with input CTF , ProofV with input
(CTF , P KUi ) outputs 1 if it is interacting with all the ProofUi with input (CTF ,
CP K, SKUi ).
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The Proposed Scheme

Firstly, a short review of Cramer and Shoup’s CCA2 encryption scheme [CS98]
and Desai’s CCA2 Unbalanced Feistel Encryption (UFE) scheme [Des00] is given.
Secondly, the proof protocol between the cloud server (verifier) and the multiple
users (prover) is described. Thirdly, the main construction of the proposed scheme is
presented. The proposed construction is based on the original scheme in [HHPSP11]
and Cramer and Shoup’s CCA2 encryption scheme is used to encrypt CSK.

7.3.1

Cramer and Shoup’s CCA2 encrytion scheme

KeyGeneration. Choose random elements g1 , g2 ∈ G and x1 , x2 , y1 , y2 , z ∈ Zp .
Choose a hash function H from the family of universal one-way hash functions.
Then the private key is (x1 , x2 , y1 , y2 , z), the public key is (g1 , g2 , e, d, h, H) where
e = g1x1 · g2x2 , d = g1y1 · g2y2 , h = g1z .
Encryption. Given a symmetric key k ∈ G, the encryption algorithm chooses
r ∈R Zp and generates the ciphertext CT = (c1 , c2 , c3 , c4 ) where c1 = g1r , c2 = g2r ,
c3 = hr · k and c4 = (g1x1 g2x2 )r · (g1y1 g2y2 )r·H(c1 ,c2 ,c3 ) .
Decryption. Given a ciphertext CT , this algorithm computes ω = H(c1 , c2 , c3 ) and
test if cx1 1 +y1 ω · cx2 2 +y2 ω equals to c4 . If yes, this algorithm outputs k = c3 /cz1 .

7.3.2

Desai’s CCA2 UFE scheme

Desai’s UFE scheme is a CCA2 symmetric encryption scheme which is based on a
variable-length input pseudorandom function (VI-PRF) and a variable-length output pseudorandom function (VO-PRF). A VI-PRF is a function that takes inputs of
any pre-specified length or of variable length and outputs some fixed length. Some
efficient constructions of VI-PRFs are the CBC-MAC variant analyzed by Petrank
and Rackoff [PR00] and the “three-way” variants of Black and Rogaway [BR00]. A
VO-PRF is a function that takes inputs a fixed-length part and a part specifying the
length of the required output, outputs some pre-specified length or variable length.
A simple and efficient VO-PRF has been presented in [Des00]. Denote Kvi−prf and
Kvo−prf are the randomized key generation algorithms for VI-PRF and VO-PRF
respectively. Let I : Kvi−prf × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ be a VI-PRF. Let G : Kvo−prf ×
{0, 1}∗ × 1∗ → {0, 1}∗ be a VO-PRF. The UFE scheme is as following.
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KeyGeneration. This algorithm specifies a key k = k1 kk2 (|k1 | = |k2 |) where
k1 ← Kvi−prf and k2 ← Kvo−prf .
Encryption. Given a file F , this algorithm chooses a random r ← {0, 1}λ , computes
C = F ⊕ Gk2 (r) and σ = r ⊕ Ik1 (C), and outputs a ciphertext CT = Ckσ.
Decryption. Given a ciphertext CT , this algorithm firstly parses CT as Ckσ where
|σ| = λ and then computes r = σ ⊕ Ik1 (C). The output of this algorithm is F =
C ⊕ Gk2 (r).

7.3.3

Main Construction

The main construction of the proposed scheme is as follows.
KeyGenC . Takes the security parameter λ as input, this algorithm outputs the
symmetric key k = k1 kk2 .
KeyGenU . This algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and gives as
output (pki , ski ) for user set I ⊂ {1, · · · , n}. For each user i ∈ I, this algorithm
chooses random elements g1 , g2 ∈ G and xi1 , xi2 , yi1 , yi2 , zi ∈ Zp , computes
ei = g1 xi1 · g2 xi2 , di = g1 yi1 · g2 yi2 , hi = g1 zi .
Then the public key pki = (g1 , g2 , ei , di , hi , H) and the secret key ski = (xi1 , xi2 , yi1 ,
yi2 , zi ).
FilePrepC ({pki }i∈I , k, F ) → (CTF , {CTi }i∈I ). This algorithm takes as input the
file F , the symmetric key k and all pki for i ∈ I, it outputs the ciphertext of file F
as CTF = Ckσ where C = F ⊕ Gk2 (r1 ) and σ = r1 ⊕ Ik1 (C) for r1 ← {0, 1}λ . It also
outputs the ciphertexts CTi as CTi = (Ci1 , Ci2 , Ci3 , Ci4 ) where Ci1 = g1r2 , Ci2 = g2r2 ,
Ci3 = hri 3 · k, and Ci4 = (g1 xi1 g2 xi2 )r2 · (g1 yi1 g2 yi2 )r2 ·H(Ci1 ,Ci2 ,Ci3 ) for r2 ∈R Zp .
FilePrepV (CTF → v) Before generating the verification information v, the input
buffer CTF is firstly pre-processed into R(CTF )by using the erasure-code R(·). DiF )|
vides R(CTF ) into m = d |R(CT
e blocks. In the following, each block is referred
λ

as mj for 1 6 j 6 m. This algorithm then construct a binary Merkle-tree M TH,λ,i
(with respect to hash function H) on the data blocks mj as m leaf nodes. It groups
the hashed leaves in pairs and continue to hash each pair until reach the root node
Hroot . At last, this root node is stored as the verification information v.
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Proof. The tuple of algorithms {ProofUi }i∈I , ProofV interact as follows.
• ProofV sends the ciphertexts CTF , CTi to ProofUi .
• ProofUi computes ω = H(Ci1 , Ci2 , Ci3 ) and tests if
?

xi1 +yi1 ·ω
xi2 +yi2 ·ω
Ci1
· Ci2
= Ci4 .

If yes, then computes
k = k1 kk2 =

Ci3
z ,
Ci1i

r1 = σ ⊕ Ik1 (C), F = C ⊕ Gk2 (r1 ).

• ProofV runs M T PH (v, m, u) and chooses random u leaf nodes, where u is
the smallest integer such that (1 − α)u <  for desired soundness bound .
ProofV also randomly chooses c, d ∈R Zp and computes D = g1c · g2d . Let
L ⊂ {1, · · · , u} be the index set of the leaf nodes. ProofV sends L and D to
ProofUi as the challenge.
• ProofUi first computes A = k · yi ti for some random ti ∈ Zp , yi ∈ G. Then
ProofUi chooses ρzi ,ρti , ρxi1 , ρxi2 , ρyi1 , ρyi2 ∈R Zp and computes
ρz

Ti1 = Ci1 i · yi −ρti ,
ρz

Ti2 = g1 i ,
ρx

ρx

ω ρyi1
ω ρyi2
Ti3 = Ci1 i1 · (Ci1
)
· Ci2 i2 · (Ci2
) ,
ρxi2

ρxi1

· g2

ρyi1

· g2

Ti4 = g1
Ti5 = g1

ρyi2

,
.

ProofUi next constructs the Merkle-tree M TH,λ which is corresponding with
{mj }16j6m . Denote Pj the set of all the sibling nodes on the path from leaf
mj to root Hroot in M TH,λ . After that, ProofUi sends ProofV the proof (A,
Ti1 , Ti2 , Ti3 , Ti4 , Ti5 , {mji }j∈L,i∈I , {Pji }j∈L,i∈I }).
• ProofV randomly sends the challenge c, d to ProofUi .
• ProofUi checks if D = g1c · g2d and computes
zzi = ρzi − c · zi ,

zti = ρti − c · ti ,

zxi1 = ρxi1 − c · xi1 , zxi2 = ρxi2 − c · xi2 ,
zyi1 = ρyi1 − c · yi1 ,

zyi2 = ρyi2 − c · yi2 .

and sends (zzi , zti , zxi1 , zxi2 , zyi1 ,zyi2 ) to ProofV .
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• ProofV generates {Hroot }i∈I according to ({lji }j∈L,i∈I , {Pji }j∈L,i∈I ) and computes v 0 = H({Hroot }i∈I ). It outputs 1 if the following equations hold
?

v 0 = v,
Ci3 c
zz
] · Ci1 i · (y −1 )zti ,
A
zz
?
Ti2 = hci · g1 i ,
?

Ti1 = [

zx

zx

?

ω zyi2
ω zyi1
c
) ,
· Ci2 i2 · (Ci2
)
· Ci1 i1 · (Ci1
Ti3 = Ci4
zxi2

?

zxi1

· g2

?

zyi1

· g2 i2 .

Ti4 = eci · g1

Ti5 = dci · g1

,

zy

and 0 otherwise.

7.4

Security Requirement

There are two security requirements that a construction of PMOW scheme must
possess. One concerns about joint proof of ownership. Specifically, in a PMOW
scheme with joint proof of ownership, a valid proof can only be generated by all
privilege users who have the whole file F . Another one regards indistinguishability.
In a PMOW scheme with indistinguishability, no cloud server should be able to
learn the verified file during the proof executions.

7.4.1

Joint proof of ownership

This requirement is formalized by using security game played between a challenger C
and an adversary A. In the PMOW-game, the challenger C denotes the cloud server
and the adversaryA = (A1 , A2 ) denotes n cheating users. A1 controls all the users
and can make arbitrary queries to the challenger. A2 (sti ) presents a user i with
input the state information sti . The game is divided into two phases, the learning
phase and the proof phase. In the learning phase, A1 generates arbitrary state
information after querying the challenger; in the proof phase, every user A2 (sti )
generates his proof without any interaction.
PMOW-game
• Setup: The challenger C runs KeyGenC to generate a key pair (CPK, CSK).
The challenger C also runs KeyGenU to generate n key pairs (PK∗ ,SK∗ ). The
adversary A is given (CPK, PK∗ ,SK∗ ).
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• Phase 1: For any file F , the adversary A1 can make arbitrary queries to
the challenger C before the proof protocol begins. For (PK∗ , SK∗ ), the challenger generates the verification information v and returns the ciphertext
of CTF and CSK. The adversary A1 outputs arbitrary state information
(st1 , st2 , · · · , stn ).
• Phase 2: The adversary A2 takes input the state information sti , 1 6 i 6 n
individually. Without any interaction, A2 (st1 ), A2 (st2 ), · · · , A2 (stn ) output
a prover machine P and a joint proof v 0 .
Informally speaking, the joint proof of ownership property requires that if P can
pass through the proof protocol with C, A2 (sti ) should be in possession of the file
CTF and symmetric key k. This can be formalized as follows.
Definition 7.3 (Soundness) A PMOW scheme is sound if there exist a knowledge
extractor K = (K1 , K2 ) that can recover CTF and CSK from every A2 (sti ) (1 6 i 6
n) with non-negligible probability.
Theorem 7.2 The construction of a PMOW scheme captures the joint proof of
ownership if Halevis POW scheme is secure in the random oracle model.
Proof. The proof is divided into two parts. In the first part, the construction of
a PMOW scheme is proven to be a proof of ownership protocol with soundness
(1 − α)u . Assume that there is an adversary A2 (sti ) that breaks the joint proofof-ownership property. Specifically, it is assumed that the erasure code can correct
erasure of up to α-f raction of the input. It is also assumed that the adversary
A2 (sti ) runs an most qk proof protocols and succeeds in convincing the cloud server
with probability better than t(1 − α)u + β (t denotes the bits of min entropy of any
input distribution D) for a non-negligible β.
Now it is shown how to construct the extractor K1 . Note that K1 will only be
used in proofs. It is an extractor from Merkle-tree lemma (which says that every
prover that passes the Merkle-tree protocol with high enough probability can be
converted into an extractor that extracts most of the leaves of the tree). If a prover
P ∗ has probability at least (1 − α)u + β of convincing the verifier in the Merkletree protocol (for some α, β ∈ (0, 1]), then with probability at least 1/4 (over its
internal randomness) the extractor K outputs values for at least a (1 − α)-fraction
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of the leaves of the tree, together with valid sibling paths for all these leaves. In
[HHPSP11], the security of Merkle-tree lemma has been proven.
A simulator S is created. S gets as input a random hash function H ∈ H. The
simulator S chooses the encrypted file CTF ∈ D and runs the PMOW game with
the challenger. Whenever the adversary A2 (sti ) begins a new interaction with the
challenger C, the simulator S uses the extractor K1 to extract a (1−α)-fraction of the
leaves of the tree. If these (1 − α) fraction of the leaves differ from the corresponding
leaves in CTF , then the simulator S extracts a collision for the hash function h form
the Merkle tree, since both the paths in the real tree M TH,λ (F ) and the paths given
by the adversary A2 (sti ) (who is the prover) are valid.
As it is also assumed that the adversary (the same as the extractor) is missing at
least slackness s bits of min-entropy about encrypted file CTF , then the probability
of the extractor K1 outputting (1 − α)-fraction of CTF is at most 2−s . It is assumed
that the adversary wins the game in at least one of the k executions of the protocol
with probability at least (1 − α)u + β/k. Hence with probability at least β/2k over
the choice of H ∈ H, this function H still leaves the adversary with probability
greater than (1 − α)u + β/2k of convincing the verifier in the protocol execution.
For such hash function H, the extractor K1 will have probability of at least 1/4 to
output (1 − α)-fraction of the leaves. Hence for such function h, collisions can be
found with probability at least 1/4 − 2−s , and the overall collision probability is at
least β/2k · (1/4 − 2−s ) ≈ β/8k.
Thus, whenever the adversary A2 (sti ) begins a successful interaction with the
challenger C, the extractor K1 can extract

1−α
m

leaves of lij for every A2 (sti ), 1 6

i 6 n. That is to say, the extractor K1 can output enough leaves to extract CTF
from every A2 (sti ) will take

m2
(1−α)·β

interactions.

In the second part, the construction of a PMOW scheme is proven to be a joint
proof of ownership protocol. Now it is shown how to construct the extractor K2 .
As the same as K1 , K2 will only be used in proofs too. It is an algorithm that runs
in probabilistic polynomial time on input the prover machine P , CP K and P KUi .
The output of the extractor K2 is the symmetric key k and SKUi .
The knowledge extractor K2 will work in the following way: If the prover machine
P responds correctly to an initial challenge c, then K2 rewinds P and issues a
different challenge c0 for which P also responds correctly. If the extractor K2 can
find two such challenges c and c0 , then K2 has the following equations:
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0
Ci3 c0
Ci3 c
zz0
zz
] · Ci1 i · (y −1 )zti = [
] · Ci1 i · (y −1 )zti ,
A
A

zz

zz0

0

Ti2 = hci · g1 i = hci · g1 i ,
zx

zx

0

zx0

zx0

0

0

c
ω zyi1
ω zyi2
c
ω zyi1
ω zyi2
Ti3 = Ci4
· Ci1 i1 · (Ci1
· Ci2 i2 · (Ci2
)
)
= Ci4
· Ci1 i1 · (Ci1
)
· Ci2 i2 · (Ci2
) ,
zxi1

Ti4 = eci · g1

zyi1

Ti5 = dci · g1

zxi2

· g2

zyi2

· g2

0

zx0 i1

zx0 i2

0

zy0 i1

= eci · g1

· g2

= dci · g1

,

zy0 i2

· g2 .

If denotes 4c = c0 − c, 4zzi = zz0 i − zzi , 4zti = zt0i − zti , 4zxi1 = zx0 i1 − zxi1 ,
4zxi2 = zx0 i2 − zxi2 , 4zyi1 = zy0 i1 − yxi1 , 4zyi2 = zy0 i2 − zyi2 , from the above equations
it can have
Ci3 4c
−4zz
] = Ci1 i · (y −1 )−4zti ,
A
−4zz
h4c
= g1 i ,
i
[

4zxi1

4zxi2

−4c
= Ci1
Ci4

4zxi2

4zxi1

e−4c
= g1
i
=
d−4c
i

ω 4zyi1
· (Ci1
)
· Ci2

· g2

4zy
g1 i1

·

ω 4zyi2
· (Ci2
)
,

,

4zy
g2 i2 .

Then it has
Ci3
4zzi

= A · y−

4zt
i
4c

,

Ci1

hi =

−
gi

4zzi
4c

,

4zx
− 4ci1

Ci4 = Ci1
−

4zxi1
4c

−

4zyi1
4c

ei = g1

di = g1

ω −
· (Ci1
)
−

4zxi2
4c

−

4zyi2
4c

· g2

· g2

4zyi1
4c

−

· Ci2

4zxi2
4c

ω −
· (Ci2
)

4zyi2
4c

,

,
.

Thus the knowledge extractor K2 can compute k = A · y −

4zzi
4c

, zi = −4zzi /4c,

xi1 = −4zxi1 /4c, xi2 = −4zxi2 /4c, yi1 = −4zyi1 /4c and yi2 = −4zyi2 /4c. In
other words, the extractor K2 can obtain k and SKUi from the above equations.
The extraction is required to be succeed (with all but negligible probability) from
the adversary A2 (sti ) (prover) that causes the challenger C (verifier) to accept with
a non-negligible probability β. Then the knowledge extractor K2 can recover the
symmetric key k from such an adversary will take O(n/β) interactions.
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Indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attack

The indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack is defined as the
following game between the challenger C and the adversary A. In the Indistinguishabilitygame, the challenger C denotes the client and honest users and the adversary A
denotes a cheating cloud server who wants to learn the file that are stored in clouds.
Indistinguishability-game
• Setup: The challenger C takes a sufficiently large security parameter and
runs KeyGenC to generate a key pair (CPK, CSK). The challenger C also
runs KeyGenU to generate n key pairs (PKi , SKi ) for user set {Ui }i∈I . The
adversary A is given (CPK, PKi ).
• Query Phase 1: The adversary A can perform a polynomially bounded
number of following queries in an adaptive manner:
– FilePrep Query: A submits a file F . C chooses a random symmetric key
k and replies with
FilePrep(F , {Ui }i∈I ) = (CTF , {CTi (k)}i∈I ).
– Reveal Query: A submits the ciphertexts of CTF0 and {CTi0 (k)}i∈I . C
replies with file F .
– Proof Query: A submits the ciphertexts of CTF and {CTi (k)}i∈I , and
the user set {Ui }i∈I . C replies with P roof .
• Challenge Phase: A gives two messages F0∗ and F1∗ to the challenger C. C
randomly picks a bit b and sends (CTF∗b , {CTi∗ (k)}i∈I ) to A as returns.
• Query Phase 2: The adversary A can issue the same type of queries as
query phase 1, except it cannot submit reveal queries with input (CTF∗b ,
{CTi∗ (k)}i∈I ).
• Guess Phase: A outputs a guess b∗ .
The advantage of an adversary A in the Indistinguishability-game is defined to
be
AdvA = P r[b∗ = b] − 21 .
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Definition 7.4 (Indistinguishability) A construction of PMOW is IND-CCA secure if no PPT adversary A can win Indistinguishability-game with non-negligible
advantage.
Theorem 7.3 The construction of a PMOW is secure if Cramer and Shoups
scheme is CCA2 secure.
Proof. Assume there exist an adversary A that can win the Indistinguishability
game with non-negligible probability . Then a simulator S which interacts with
the adversary A can be constructed. In order to simplify the proof, an ideal cipher
Enc is used, instead of Desais CCA2 symmetric encryption scheme. S runs in the
following way:
• Setup. S receives the public keys P Ki of the encryption schemes. Based on
the public keys P Ki , S chooses a hash function H(·) and an erasure code R(·).
Then S sends all the public parameters to the adversary A.
• Queries Simulation. S simulates all the queries as follows.
– FilePrep Query: S maintains an ideal cipher table of triples (k, F, CTF )
of answered queries CTF = Enck (F ). The ideal cipher table is referred
as “Enc-table”. If there exists a tuple (k, F, CTF ) in the Enc-table, S
returns CTF . Else, S computes the value CTF = Enc(k, F ) and records
(k, F, CTF ) in the Enc-table. Upon receiving the fileprep query for a file
F , S chooses a random key k, searches the Enc-table and outputs the
ciphertexts (CTF , CTi (k)) where CTF = Enck (F ) and {CTi (k)}i∈I =
{(Ci1 , Ci2 , Ci3 ,Ci4 )}i∈I where Ci1 = g1r2 , Ci2 = g2r2 , Ci3 = hri 3 · k, and
Ci4 = (g1 xi1 g2 xi2 )r2 · (g1 yi1 g2 yi2 )r2 ·H(Ci1 ,Ci2 ,Ci3 ) for r2 ∈R Zp .
– Reveal Query: Define DO1 as the decryption oracle of Cramer and Shoups
scheme and DO2 as the decryption oracle of ideal cipher Enc. If there
exists a tuple (k, F, CTF ) in the Enc-table, DO2 answers F . Otherwise, DO2 picks a random F ← {0, 1}λ , records (k, F, CTF ) in the Enctable and returns F while making sure that no collision is created for
Enc−1 (k, ·). Upon receiving the reveal query for the ciphertexts of CTF0
and {CTi0 (k)}i∈I . S uses DO1 and DO2 to output the file F .
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– Proof Query: Upon receiving the proof query for the ciphertexts of CTF
and {CTi (k)}i∈I , and the user set {Ui }i∈I . S produces an interaction that
is indistinguishable form the adversary’s interaction with the provers. In
other words, S plays the role of a full zero-knowledge simulator for proof
queries.
∗ A sends the values I, u, D to S.
0
0
0
∗ S randomly picks and sends Ti10 , Ti20 , Ti30 , Ti40 , Ti50 , A0 , Ci1
, Ci2
, Ci3
,
0
∈R Zp to A.
Ci4

∗ A returns c, d to S.
∗ S validates D = g1c · g2d and rewinds the verifier to the point when it
receives the tuple (I, u, D).
∗ S randomly picks zzi , zti , zxi1 , zxi2 , zyi1 , zyi2 , A, Ci1 , Ci2 , Ci3 , Ci4
∈R Zp and computes the following values for ω = H(Ci1 , Ci2 , Ci3 ):
v 0 = v,
Ci3 c
zz
] · Ci1 i · (y −1 )zti ,
A
zz
c
Ti2 = hi · g1 i ,
Ti1 = [

zx

zx

c
ω zyi1
ω zyi2
Ti3 = Ci4
· Ci1 i1 · (Ci1
)
· Ci2 i2 · (Ci2
) ,
zxi2

zxi1

· g2

zyi1

· g2 i2 .

Ti4 = eci · g1

Ti5 = dci · g1

,

zy

To the adversary A all the distributions given by S are indistinguishable from the real one generated by the provers.
• Challenge. A submits two messages F0∗ and F1∗ . S chooses two random
keys k0∗ , k1∗ , flips a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1}, and computes CT ∗ = Enc(kb , Fb ) and
{CTi∗ (k)} = Encpki (kb ) for i ∈ I.
Suppose there exists an adversary A which can win the Indistinguishability game
with non-negligible probability

1
2

+ , in the following it is shown that the simulator

S can breaks the CCA2 security of Cramer and Shoups encryption scheme Enc.
The adversary A is given the ciphertexts of CT ∗ = Enc(kb , Fb ) and {CTi∗ (k)} =
Encpki (kb ) for i ∈ I. If A can win the game with non-negligible probability

1
2

+ ,

the simulator S can distinguish the ideal cipher textbf Enc from a random funtion
correctly with a probability

1
2

+ 2 . The reason is that if Enc is a random function,
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• Setup. The client C invokes the algorithm KeyGenC to generate a
symmetric key k and also invokes the algorithm KeyGenU to generate n pairs of matching public and secret keys (pki , ski ) for user set
I ⊂ {1, · · · , n}. C then invokes FilePrepC for file F and sends the
ciphertexts (CTF , CTi ) to the cloud server V. V invokes FilePrepV
to construct the binary Merkle-tree M TH,λ and generate the verification
information v. Note that V only access the verification information v
during the protocol executions.
• Proof. V verifies the proof of multiparty ownership by invoking the
interactive algorithm Proof with the multiple users Ui .
Figure 7.3: A PMOW System
probability that A wins is exactly 1/2 since CT ∗ contains no information about b.
On the other hand, if Enc is not a random function, A can win with probability
1
2

+ . Then the simulator S can answer correctly with probability

1
2

+ 2 . Thus the

simulator S can break the CCA2 security of Cramer and Shoups encryption scheme
with non-negligible probability

7.5

1
2

+ 2 .

Complexity Analysis

In this section, a PMOW system is first given. Then the complexity of the proposed
scheme is analyzed, in the aspects of communication, computation and storage costs.

7.5.1

A PMOW System

A PMOW system can be constructed as in Figure 7.3, from the proposed scheme
in two phases: Setup and P roof . It should be emphasized that the cloud server
only accesses the small verification information v, rather than the stored encrypted
file when verifying the joint proof. Moreover, the cloud server does not retrieve any
data during the proof executions.

7.5.2

Complexity Analysis

Communication Costs. On the client side, the communications only occur in
Setup phase and the cost is O(n) as the client needs to send the cloud server the
ciphertexts of the symmetric key for all the users. The communications only occur
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in Proof phase on both of verifier and user side, and the costs are O(n) and O(u)
respectively.
Storage Costs. The additional storage costs which are brought by the proposed
scheme are considered. The storage cost mainly occurs on the verifier side as all the
ciphertexts are outsourced to cloud storage. Separate analysis of the storage cost is
given on the client side, the verifier side and the user side.
• Client side. The client has to store the symmetric key for the file. In addition,
he has to store the matching public and private keys for the multiple users.
The total cost is 2|k| + 11n · |p| bits (k is the key length for VO-PRF and
VI-PRF, e.g., |k| = 128bit).
• Verifier side. The cloud server has to store the verification information v, and
all the public keys for the users. In addition, he has to store all the ciphertexts
and the symmetric key. Denote |M | as the total length of the outsourced file
F . Then the cost is |M | + 2|λ| + 10n · |p| bits.
• User side. Every user needs to store the corresponding public keys, private
keys and the file F . The total storage cost for n users is |M | + 11n · |p| bits.
Computation Costs. Separate analysis of the computation costs is also given on
the client side, the verifier side and the user side.
• Client side. The computation cost on the client side only occurs in Setup
phase, for encrypting the input file F and the symmetric key k for the user set
n
I ⊂ {1, · · · , n}. The computation cost of the client is 19nTexp (|p|, p) +Thash
7n
2
2
+Tmulti
+Txor
+Tprf
, where Texp (len, num) is the time cost for computing a
n
modular exponentiation with a len-bit long exponent modular num, Thash
is
n
the time cost of n hashing operations, Tmulti
is the time cost of n multiplin
n
cations, Txor
is the time cost of n xor operations and Tprf
is the time cost

of n pseudorandom functions (either V O − P RF or V I − P RF ). The time
complexity on the client side is O(n).
• Verifier side. The cloud server needs to generate the verification information
v and check whether the six equations hold. During the whole protocol execution, the cloud server has to do (m − 1) hashing operations, 16n modular
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exponentiations and 14n multiplications. The computation cost on verifier
14n
. The time complexity on the
side is 16nTexp (|p|, p) +T ( m − 1)hash +Tmulti

verifier side is O(n).
• User side. The main computation cost on the user side occurs for generating
the joint proof. For every user i ⊂ I, he needs to compute m − 1 + 1 hash,
nineteen multiplications, eight additions, fifteen modular exponentiations, two
xor operations and two pseudorandom functions. Thus the computation cost
m
8
2
2
n
on user side is 15Texp (|p|, p) +Thash
+T 1 9multi +Tadd
+Txor
+Tprf
where Tadd
F )|
is the time cost of n additions. As m = d |R(CT
e, the time complexity on the
λ

user side is O(1).

7.6

Conclusion

In this chapter, the solution of proof-of-multiparty-ownership (PMOW) is proposed. Multiple users can prove to a cloud server about their joint ownership, when
they do not send the file to the server actually. Additionally, the cloud server stores
one ciphertext only. In client-side deduplication, the proposed proposal can counter
the attacks as follows: 1) Malicious users cheat on the cloud server about their joint
ownership, when some users do not have the file, 2) the untrusted cloud server reveals the client’s file, 3) when an attacker has a short information of the file, he fools
the cloud server about his ownership. Two definitions for security are defined and
CCA2 security is achieved under the ideal cipher model. The full proof analysis and
complexity analysis of the proposed scheme are also presented.

Chapter 8
Conclusions

8.1

Summary of The Contributions

The contributions of this thesis can be briefly concluded as follows.

8.1.1

Key Management in Cloud Computing

Data encryption before outsourcing to the cloud is a common and simple way to
protect data privacy. Although the encryption algorithms are public, information
encrypted under these algorithms is secure because the key used to encrypt the
data remains secret. As a result, key management is a critical element in cloud
computing. It is the ability to correctly assign, secure and monitor keys that defines
the level of operational security provided by any encryption implementation.
In Chapter 3, it is found that a traditional tree-based approach has some drawbacks. In a traditional tree-based key management hierarchy, a node key holder
can derive all the child keys. In order to solve this problem and maintain the key
management feature, in this chapter OWUR/W applications for data sourcing were
proposed and a secure and flexible tree-based key derivation hierarchy was presented.
The proposed tree-based key derivation hierarchy allowed the outsourcing party to
access the data block located at a specified node, while not being able to access
the data blocks encrypted with child keys. It is believed that the proposed treebased outsourcing key management opens up an entirely new approach for secure
and flexible key management.

8.1.2

Access Control in Cloud Computing

Unlike the traditional access control in which the data users and storage servers are
in the same trusted domain, access control techniques are very different in cloud
114
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computing as the cloud servers are not considered trustworthy by most cloud users,
especially large enterprises and organizations. One possible method to enforce data
access control without relying on cloud servers could be to encrypt data and disclose
the corresponding decryption keys only to the privileged users, but that causes high
performance costs. A fine-grained access control which is efficient and secure is
necessary for cloud computing.
In Chapter 4, an encryption scheme for a two-tier system was presented to achieve
flexible and fine-grained access control in the cloud. Most of the computationintensive tasks were delegated to cloud servers without leaking private data. The
security of the proposed scheme was also proven in the standard model.

8.1.3

Searchable Encryption Techniques in Cloud Computing

As the data is usually encrypted before being outsourced to cloud servers, how to
search the encrypted data in the cloud has recently gained attention and led to the
development of searchable encryption techniques. This problem is challenging, however, because meeting performance, system usability and scalability requirements is
extremely difficult.
In Chapter 5, an efficient SPEKS was constructed. SPEKS is suitable for
keyword search in the cloud environment. Compared with the existing keyword
search schemes such as [LYCL11, WCRL12, ÖS12], the proposed construction is
much more efficient from the point of view of both the data owner and the cloud
servers. In addition, the security of the proposed scheme had been proved in the
standard model.

8.1.4

Remote Integrity Check

Storing data in the remote cloud servers has become common. As the clients store
their important data in remote cloud servers without a local copy, it is important
to check remote data integrity (RIC). While it is easy to check data integrity after
completely downloading the data, it is a large waste of communication bandwidth.
Hence, designing efficient remote integrity check protocols without downloading the
data is an important security issue in the cloud.
In Chapter 6, a privacy-preserving RIC protocol was proposed. The proposed
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protocol achieved public verifiability without disclosing any information. It is ensured that no information about the original data would be leaked. In fact, the
verifier was only required to know the public key of the data owner. The experimental results indicated that the proposed scheme is efficient especially when the size
of the data file is large or the integrity check is frequent. The full proofs of security
was also given under the random oracle model.

8.1.5

Proof of Ownership

Beyond storage integrity, proof of ownership (POW) is another security issue related
to cloud data storage. Client-side deduplication allows an attacker to gain access
to arbitrary-size files when he has small hash signatures of these files. To overcome
such attacks, the technique of POW allows a user efficiently prove to a cloud server
about his ownership, rather than some short information (i.e. a short hash value of
the file).
In Chapter 7, an innovative PMOW scheme for proof of multiparty ownership
with the encrypted data was proposed. Every user can prove to the server that he
holds the plaintext of the encrypted file when the server stores one ciphertext only.
The proposed solution achieved CCA2 security and the full proof analysis was given
in the ideal cipher model.

8.2

Future Work

How to design efficient dynamic POR schemes is still an open problem. In addition,
how to prevent malicious cloud users from abusing cloud resources is still a security
issue (i.e., malicious data hosting or bonnet command and control). One way to solve
this problem is to monitor the cloud usage more strictly, however this is inevitably
in conflict with legal users’ privacy rights. Further research is needed.
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